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INTRODUCTION
“These ladies are the worst of the worst. . . . ”1 Or, at least so said
the sponsor of the nation’s first criminal law expressly authorizing
prosecution of women for assault based on illegal drug use during
pregnancy.2 Admittedly, there is intuitive appeal to throwing a
pregnant woman who uses drugs in jail. The images of a baby
detoxing can be heart-wrenching, and the idea of a mother who
would harm her baby for a “high” is abhorrent.3 On the surface,
these cases typify good versus evil.
However, medical experts who have studied pregnant drug use
uniformly oppose criminalization.4 They describe drug addiction as a

1. H.R. 1295, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. Apr. 9, 2014, 5:14:32)
(statement of Rep. Terri Lynn Weaver), available at http://tnga.granicus.com/Media
Player.php?view_id=200&clip_id=9325 [hereinafter Statement of Representative
Weaver].
2. Id.; GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: SUBSTANCE ABUSE
DURING PREGNANCY (Aug. 10, 2015) [hereinafter STATE POLICIES] (only Tennessee
specifically criminalizes drug use during pregnancy), available at http://www.gutt
macher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SADP.pdf.
3. Tony Gonzalez & Shelley DuBois, Born Hurting: Tennessee’s Struggle with
Addicted Mothers and Their Babies, TENNESSEAN, June 15, 2014, available at
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/investigations/2014/06/13/drug-dependentbabies-challenge-doctors-politicians/10112813/ (“No one who hears it ever forgets the
sound. When newborn babies begin to withdraw from powerful drugs, they shriek at
a high, telltale pitch . . . they convulse, projectile vomit or writhe . . . [they] are []
heart-wrenching . . . .”).
4. U.N. Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical
and Mental Health, Note of the Secretary-General, (Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter
Special Rapporteur Position] (discussing that criminal sanctions violate the right to
health), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1752555.96637726.html; Brief for
American Public Health Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
ii, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936), 2000 WL
33599645 [hereinafter Health Expert’s Amicus];; American Academy of Pediatrics,
Committee on Substance Abuse, Drug-Exposed Infants, 86 PEDIATRICS, 639, 641
(1990) [hereinafter AAP Position] (criminal sanctions are “unjustifiable”);; American
Medical Association, Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy:
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disease that requires treatment.5 Where others see blame, medical
experts point to a complicated confluence of genetic, environmental,
and structural factors that make certain individuals uniquely
vulnerable to drug use.6 With regard to pregnant women, physicians
emphasize the interconnectedness of mother and baby and warn that
criminalizing pregnant drug use is far more likely to deter prenatal
care than to deter drug use.7 The narrative of good versus evil must
be rewritten to reflect empirical evidence that disease and structural
violence play a significant, often understated, role in pregnant drug
use.
Nonetheless, it is indisputable that there is a growing epidemic
of narcotic drug use among pregnant women. Nationwide, the
incidence of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS)—a clinical
diagnosis of drug withdrawal syndrome in a baby commonly caused
by exposure to narcotic drugs in utero—nearly tripled from 2000 to
2009.8 The incidence of NAS then doubled again from 2009 to 2012.9

Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful
Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2667 (1990) [hereinafter AMA
Position]; American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Committee on
Health Care for Underserved Women, Substance Abuse Reporting and Pregnancy:
The Role of the Obstetrician-Gynecologist, 473 ACOG (Jan. 2011),
http://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-forUnderserved-Women/co473.pdf? [hereinafter ACOG Substance Abuse Opinion].
5. Health Expert’s Amicus, supra note 4, at ii; AAP Position, supra note 4, at
640–41; ACOG Substance Abuse Opinion, supra note 4.
6. ACOG Substance Abuse Opinion, supra note 4 (“Addiction is a chronic,
relapsing biological and behavioral disorder with genetic components.”);; By some
estimates, more than eighty percent of addicted women have at least one chemically
dependent parent. Karen Heller, One Doctor’s Crusade Twenty Years Ago, Loretta
Finnegran First Became Aware of the Agony Faced by Addict Mothers and Their
Babies And She Set Out to Do Something About It, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 19,
1989, at 1, available at http://articles.philly.com/1989-11-19/news/26136759_1_drugusers-addict-mothers-cocaine-users.
7. AAP Position, supra note 4, at 641; AMA Position, supra note 4, at 2667;
ACOG Substance Abuse Opinion, supra note 4.
8. Stephen W. Patrick et al., Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and Associated
Health Care Expenditures: United States, 2000–2009, 307 JAMA 1934, 1937 (2012)
[hereinafter Associated Health Care Expenditures] (incidence of NAS nationwide
nearly tripled from 2000 to 2009).
9. Stephen W. Patrick et al., Increasing Incidence and Geographic Distribution
of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome: United States 2009 to 2012, 35 J. PERINATOLOGY
650, 653 (2015) [hereinafter Geographic Distribution of NAS] (incidence of NAS
nationwide nearly doubled from 2009 to 2012); see also Veeral N. Toila et al.,
Increasing Incidence of the Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome in U.S. Neonatal ICUs
372:2 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2118, 2118 (2015) (“From 2004 through 2013, the rate of
NICU admissions for the neonatal abstinence syndrome increased from 7 cases per
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As a result, prosecutors are increasingly demanding further
criminalization of pregnant drug use.10
Yet, experts report that the NAS epidemic appears to be
primarily driven by a nationwide increase in prescription drug use.11
To be successful and reverse the tide of NAS births, legal reform
must focus on preventing prescription drug abuse among all
population groups, as well as increasing access to education, birth
control, and drug treatment.12 Although popular, criminalization will
not stem the rise in NAS births.
In 2014, Tennessee passed the nation’s first criminal law
expressly authorizing prosecutors to charge women with assault
based on illegal drug use during pregnancy.13 Since then, five other
states have proposed virtually identical legislation.14 Even without

1000 admissions to 27 cases per 1000 admissions.”).
10. See, e.g., Dave Boucher & Tony Gonzalez, Prosecutors Argue Law Helps
Drug-Addicted Moms, TENNESSEAN, Apr. 14, 2015, at 9A. In a statewide survey in
Tennessee, seventeen district attorneys supported criminalization, only seven
opposed it. Id.
11. Stephen W. Patrick et al., Prescription Opioid Epidemic and Infant
Outcomes, 135 PEDIATRICS 843, 846 (2015) [hereinafter Infant Outcomes] (noting the
temporal correlation between rise in prescription drug use and NAS births and
finding that “65% of infants with NAS were exposed to legally obtained [opioid pain
relievers] in pregnancy”);; see also Geographic Distribution of NAS, supra note 9, at
653 (“The rapid rise in NAS parallels the increase in [opioid pain reliever] use in the
United States, suggesting that preventing opioid overuse and misuse, especially
before pregnancy, may prevent NAS.”);; Toila et al., supra note 9, at 2122 (noting that
the “rising incidence of the neonatal abstinence syndrome is due in part to increasing
opioid use among pregnant women”).
12. Infant Outcomes, supra note 11, at 848 (“Public health efforts should focus
on limiting inappropriate [opioid pain relievers]”);; see also Health Expert’s Amicus,
supra note 4, at ii (opining that pregnant drug users need treatment, not jail); AAP
Position, supra note 4, at 640–41 (pregnant drug users need treatment, not jail);
Sarah H. Heil et al., Unintended Pregnancy in Opioid-Abusing Women, 40 J.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 199, 200 (2011) (reporting that eighty-six percent of
women who abuse opioids report that their pregnancy is unplanned); ACOG
Substance Abuse Opinion, supra note 4 (opining that pregnant drug users need
treatment, not jail); Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome Among TennCare Enrollees
Provisional 2012 Data, TENNCARE (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/
tenncare/attachments/TennCareNASData2012.pdf [hereinafter TennCare Enrollees
Provisional 2012 Data] (reporting that eighty-two percent of women prescribed
narcotics are not on contraceptives).
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (2014); STATE POLICIES, supra note 2, at 1
(noting that only Tennessee expressly criminalizes drug use during pregnancy).
14. Hayley Fox, Pregnant Drug Users Face Criminal Prosecution, But Doctors
Say That’s a Mistake, TAKE PART (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.takepart.com/article/
2015/04/01/pregnant-jail-time-drug (explaining that Tennessee’s law has already lead
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such a law, states around the country criminally prosecute women
for drug use during pregnancy pursuant to child endangerment,
feticide, and other statutes that do not expressly apply to in utero
exposure to drugs.15 However, few indictments under other states’
generic statutes have resulted in convictions that withstood appeal;16
therefore, the implications of Tennessee’s express law could be
profound. The goal of this article is to convince other states to avoid
mimicking the express criminalization of pregnant drug use that
Tennessee adopted and to encourage lawmakers in Tennessee to

to “copycat bills” in Arkansas, Oklahoma, Mississippi, and North Carolina); Emily
Lane, Should Women Who Use Drugs While Pregnant Be Charged for Harm to Child?, TIMESPICAYUNE (May 5, 2015), http://blog.nola.com/politics/print.html?entry=/2015/05/
pregnant_women_drugs_louisiana.html (explaining that Tennessee’s law served as a
model for a bill introduced in the Louisiana legislature); see also Sydney Lupkin, Why
Some Doctors Object to Tennessee Law That Criminalizes Drug Use During Pregnancy, ABC NEWS
(July
14,
2014),
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/doctors-object-tennessee-lawcriminalizes-drug-pregnancy/story?id=24557525 (quoting Lynn Paltrow, executive
director of the National Advocates for Pregnant Women, that “[v]irtually every state
has considered” some form of criminalization).
15. See, e.g., State v. Buckhalter, 119 So. 3d. 1015, 1018 (Miss. 2013)
(upholding dismissal of indictment for manslaughter based on pregnant drug use but
noting the possibility of prosecution for feticide or unlawful abortion); State v. Allen,
No. DC 14-62 & 14-27 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 2014) (charging a woman with criminal
endangerment after testing positive for illegal drugs in her first trimester; the
charges were ultimately dismissed).
16. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 221 (2001) (holding that a
hospital policy regarding involuntary drug testing of pregnant women for use in
criminal conviction violates the Fourth Amendment); State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210,
1223 (Haw. 2005) (holding that definition of “person” in a manslaughter statute did
not include a fetus, after mom’s prenatal drug use caused newborn’s death);;
Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Ky. 1993) (holding that criminal
child abuse does not extend to mother’s use of drugs while pregnant);; State v.
Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195, 1198 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the ordinary
meaning of “child” in a child abuse statute did not include fetus in case where mother
used cocaine during pregnancy); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 711 (Ohio 1992)
(holding that criminal child endangerment does not apply to a fetus). But see Hicks v.
State, 153 So.3d 53, 54 (Ala. 2014) (interpreting “child” in a criminal chemicalendangerment statute to include unborn); Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778
(S.C. 1997) (interpreting “person” in a criminal statute to include viable fetus).
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allow their law to lapse automatically.17 Absent further legislative
action, Tennessee’s law will cease to be effective on July 1, 2016.18
This article analyzes how Tennessee’s unprecedented law is
flawed and describes why even a more carefully crafted law
criminalizing pregnant drug use would be bad public policy because
such laws ignore the interconnectedness between mother and baby
as well as addiction’s unique challenges as a medical disease. Section
I provides background information on NAS and traces the
intertwined histories of fetal rights, personhood, and assault
liability. Section II illustrates how Tennessee’s law is poorly
targeted, ignoring the overwhelming majority of NAS births—twothirds of which are associated with prescription drugs.19 This section
then outlines the illusory nature of the affirmative defense for drug
treatment and the injustice of the law as applied to women who have
repeatedly sought treatment, only to be turned away because
treatment was unavailable or unaffordable.20 It explains how the
law, influenced by the fetal protection and personhood movements,

17. If sunset proves impossible, at minimum, this article seeks to provide clear
guidance for a narrower law that (1) expands the affirmative defense to protect all
who seek treatment, regardless of availability and timing; (2) no longer bases assault
against pregnant women on undefined unlawful acts; and (3) no longer applies previability.
18. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (2014).
19. See Drug Dependent Newborns (Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome)
Surveillance Summary For the Week of July 26–August 1, 2015, TENN. DEP’T OF
HEALTH (Aug. 6, 2015), http://tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/NASsummar
y_Week_3015.pdf [hereinafter 2015 Year-To-Date TN NAS Summary] (seventy-five
percent of NAS births had at least one prescribed substance linked to NAS); Angela
Miller, Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome Surveillance Annual Report Summary for
2014, TENN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/NAS
_Annual_report_2014_FINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2015) [hereinafter 2014 TN
NAS Summary] (sixty-nine percent of at least one prescribed substance linked to
NAS); Drug Dependent Newborns (Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome) December Update,
TENN. DEP’T OF HEALTH (Dec. 28, 2013), http://health.state.tn.us/MCH/PDFs/NAS/N
AS_Update_1213.pdf [hereinafter 2013 TN NAS Summary] (noting that sixty-three
percent of NAS births had at least one prescribed substance linked to NAS).
20. See Sanya Dosani, Should Pregnant Women Addicted to Drugs Face
Criminal Charges?, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 4, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/topics/t
opic/issue/Addiction.html?page=2 (reporting and criticizing the lack of treatment
availability); Rosa Goldensohn & Rachael Levy, The State Where Giving Birth Can
Be Criminal, NATION, Dec. 10, 2014, at 25 (reporting and criticizing the lack of
treatment availability); Gonzalez & DuBois, supra note 3 (“Addiction treatment is
extremely limited and costly–and nearly nonexistent for pregnant women.”);;
Cherisse A. Scott, Pregnancy Bill Makes Bad Situations Worse, TENNESSEAN, Apr.
14, 2014, at 13A (reporting and criticizing the lack of treatment availability).
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rests on the legal fiction that a pregnant woman and her fetus are
separate and independent persons. In reality, a mother and her fetus
is a dyad, thoroughly intertwined. By failing to appreciate the
interconnected nature of this relationship, the law undervalues
shared interests, especially the degree to which threatening and
punishing a mother intrinsically threatens and punishes her baby.
The thirty-seven other states that have fetal protection laws may
also be at risk of undervaluing the shared interests of this
relationship.21 Section II closes by focusing on potential harm
lurking in the sweeping, under-reported provision of the new law
that criminalizes any unlawful act by a pregnant woman that
injures her fetus.22
In Section III, the article shifts to a more general critique of any
law criminalizing pregnant drug use. Using Tennessee as a case
study, this section illustrates how criminalizing pregnant women’s
drug use fails to effectively accomplish five objectives of criminal
law—to restore, incapacitate, rehabilitate, deter, or punish. Such
laws ignore the impact of prescription drugs, the intertwined
relationship between mother and baby, and drug addiction’s unique
challenges as a medical disease. In doing so, criminalization
incentivizes abortion, deters prenatal care, wastes taxpayer money,
and undermines the health and well-being of the baby.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. Defining the Problem: Rising Drug Use and NAS
Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS) is a clinical diagnosis of
drug withdrawal syndrome in a newborn exposed to drugs in utero.23
NAS results from a mother using prescription and/or illegal drugs
during pregnancy.24 Narcotics and benzodiazepines commonly cause

21. See Erik Eckholm, Specialists Join Call for Veto of Drug Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2014, at A12 (stating thirty-seven other states have assault statutes that
define a potential victim to include a fetus); Fetal Homicide Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEG. http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx (last visited
Nov. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Fetal Homicide Laws] (“[A]t least 38 states have fetal
homicide laws.”).
22. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(1) (2014).
23. Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS) Frequently Asked Questions, TENN.
DEP’T HEALTH, https://health.state.tn.us/MCH/PDFs/NAS/NAS_FAQ.pdf (last visited
Nov. 7, 2015) [hereinafter NAS FAQs]; see also TennCare Enrollees Provisional 2012
Data, supra note 12, at 1 n. 2. NAS statistics typically exclude fetal alcohol
syndrome, harm caused to a newborn by in utero exposure to alcohol. Id.
24. See NAS FAQs, supra note 23 (excluding fetal alcohol syndrome from data);
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NAS;25 however, not all babies exposed to narcotics or
benzodiazepines in utero appear to suffer from NAS or other obvious
harm.26
NAS has a wide array of symptoms including low birth-weight,
gastrointestinal problems—like feeding intolerance, diarrhea, or
vomiting—and central nervous system problems—such as seizures,
tremors, or hyperactivity.27 The symptoms and treatment for NAS
vary based on the type, amount, and duration of drug use.28
Importantly, however, experts have concluded that “[u]nlike
neonatal exposure to maternal alcohol and tobacco use, there have
been no reported long term effects of maternal opioid use on the
developing child.”29 In fact, Dr. Loretta P. Finnegan, whose
Finnegan scoring system is often used to diagnose and rate NAS,
describes NAS as an unfortunate but relatively minor health
problem.30

see also Associated Health Care Expenditures, supra note 8, at 1934; Infant
Outcomes, supra note 11, at 650.
25. NAS FAQs, supra note 23. Benzodiazepines are a class of psychoactive
drugs commonly used to treat anxiety (e.g. Xanax), insomnia, or seizures. Use of
Psychiatric Medications During Pregnancy and Lactation, 111 ACOG PRACTICE
BULLETIN 4, at 1002, 1009 (April 2008).
26. FAQ [sic] Regarding Public Chapter 820 (PC 820) and Other Requirements
Related to Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS) in Tennessee, TENN. DEP’T HEALTH
1, http://health.state.tn.us/MCH/PDFs/NAS/NAS%20FAQs_63014L.pdf (last revised
June 24, 2014) [hereinafter NAS Law Guidance]. “Not all cases of exposure will lead
to withdrawal syndrome.” Id. In fact, as few as 55% of neonates with in utero opioid
exposure may develop NAS; conversely, other estimates suggest as many as 94%
will. Mark L. Hudek, Neonatal Drug Withdrawal, 129 PEDIATRICS 540, 541 (2012).
27. Associated Health Care Expenditures, supra note 8, at 1934; Infant
Outcomes, supra note 11, at 650; NAS FAQs, supra note 23.
28. NAS FAQs, supra note 23.
29. American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, GOVERNMENT
AFFAIRS, Toolkit on State Legislation: Pregnant Women & Prescription Drug Abuse,
Dependence and Addiction, ACOG, at 2, available at http://www.acog.org//media/Departments/Government-Relations-and-Outreach/NASToolkit.pdf (last
visited Nov. 7, 2015) [hereinafter ACOG NAS Toolkit] (also stating that,
“Longitudinal studies over 5 to 10 years have shown that children who experienced
NAS as infants do not exhibit signs of physical or cognitive impairment as they
mature.”);; see also Suzanne Wong, Alice Ordean & Meldon Kahan, Substance Use in
Pregnancy, 114 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 190, 194, 196–97 (2011) (finding
that there is no definitive evidence that NAS causes long-term health consequences).
30. Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 28 (“NAS is really a very minor
medical condition, in contrast to what can happen to a baby, both physically and
psychologically, if the mother is not in treatment.”) (quoting Dr. Lorette Finnegan).
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Moreover, many other conditions can produce the same
symptoms.31 Accordingly, health care professionals typically
diagnose NAS based on a mother’s history of drug use, evidence of
exposure—drug testing of a newborn’s urine, hair, or meconium—
and a standard scoring system.32 Diagnosis remains imperfect and
an area in which experts have called for improvement.33
Yet, treating a newborn with NAS tends to cost significantly
more than treating a non-NAS newborn. While this disparity may
decrease as more evidence-based approaches replace overtreatment
of NAS,34 in 2012, treating NAS births nationwide increased health
care charges by approximately $1.5 billion.35 In Tennessee in 2012,
the average newborn with NAS required $62,324 in health care
charges, compared to $8,359 for the average live birth.36
Nationwide, the incidence of NAS has grown nearly fivefold since
2000 while the incidence of antepartum opiate use grew by a slightly
larger factor over the same period.37 In Tennessee, the statistics are
even more alarming. Since 2000, Tennessee has seen a more than

31. Wong, Ordean, & Kahan, supra note 29, at 192. Poor birth outcomes also
correlate strongly to maternal poverty, poor nutrition, inadequate prenatal care,
domestic violence, and extensive pre-pregnancy drug use. Linda C. Fentiman,
Pursuing the Perfect Mother: Why America’s Criminalization of Maternal Substance
Abuse is Not the Answer—A Comparative Analysis, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 389,
397 (2009); see Lynn Paltrow & Katherine Jack, Pregnant Women, Junk Science, and
Zealous Defense, 34 CHAMPION 30, 32 (2010).
32. NAS Law Guidance, supra note 26, at 1; see also Wong, Ordean, & Kahan,
supra note 29, at 196.
33. Wong, Ordean, & Kahan, supra note 29, at 192–93 (stating that urine drug
screenings detect only recent drug use, and hair and meconium samples, while
detecting intrauterine use in the second or third trimester, is costly and, perhaps
more importantly, has a “propensity for false positive results”).
34. Interestingly, some of the higher cost of NAS births appears to stem from
overtreatment, not consistent with evidence-based approaches. ACOG NAS Toolkit,
supra note 29, at 2–3. “Treatment is not necessary for every infant exposed to
opioids,” and many of these infants are unnecessarily given pharmacological
treatment or placed in the NICU, despite evidence that such treatment does not
achieve optimal outcomes. Id. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the
prematurity, low birth weight and other NAS symptoms that increase cost also occur
in babies who were not exposed to drugs in utero.
35. Geographic Distribution of NAS, supra note 9, at 652–54 (stating that NAS
births add approximately $1.5 billion each year in health care charges; in 2012, the
nationwide mean hospital charges for a NAS birth reached $66,700, substantially
higher than non-NAS births).
36. TennCare Enrollees Provisional 2012 Data, supra note 12.
37. Geographic Distribution of NAS, supra note 9, at 653 (“The incidence of
NAS in the United States . . . has grown nearly fivefold since 2000.”).
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tenfold increase in the number of babies born with NAS.38 Among
babies on TennCare,39 in just four years, the incidence of NAS
almost tripled, rising from 5.3 cases of NAS per 1,000 live births in
2008 to 14.6 cases of NAS per 1,000 live births in 2012; this trend
appears to be continuing.40 In fact, Tennessee is on pace for the
fourteenth year in a row of increased NAS births.41
Beginning January 1, 2013, Tennessee became the first state in
the country to require health care providers to report all NAS cases
to the Department of Health.42 Health care providers reported 855
NAS cases in Tennessee in 201343 and 973 cases in 2014.44 However,
the Department of Health does not require health care providers to

38. NAS FAQs, supra note 23; Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS):
Background Information, TENN. DEP’T HEALTH, http://tn.gov/health/topic/nas
[hereinafter NAS Background].
39. TennCare is Tennessee’s Medicaid managed care program that provides
healthcare for low-income pregnant women and their children. TennCare Medicaid,
TENNCARE DIV. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. & ADMIN., https://www.tn.gov/tenncare/articl
e/tenncare-medicaid (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). Eligibility requires income below
195% of the federal poverty line. Major Medicaid Eligibility Categories in Tennessee,
TENNCARE DIV. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. & ADMIN., https://www.tn.gov/tenncare/articl
e/categories (under “Pregnant Women”) (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
40. TennCare Enrollees Provisional 2012 Data, supra note 12. It is worth
noting, however, that troubling identification and testing bias appears likely. Women
with family incomes of less than $20,000 per year were more than twice as likely as
women with incomes over $75,000 to report use of illegal drugs. See SHARON L.
LARSON ET AL., DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, WORKER SUBSTANCE USE
AND WORKPLACE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 15 (2007) (13.2% at $20,000 or lower v.
6.0% at $75,000 or higher). However, this differential in self-reported illegal drug use
would only explain a small fraction of the third-party reported incidence of NAS
births among TennCare enrollees.
41. Tony Gonzalez, On Pregnant Drug Use, Lawmakers Whiff on Data,
TENNESSEAN, Apr. 11, 2015, at 5A (“Tennessee is on pace for the 14th year in a row
of more drug-dependent births.”);; see also NAS FAQs, supra note 23; 2013 TN NAS
Summary, supra note 19; NAS Background, supra note 38; 2014 TN NAS Summary,
supra note 19; 2015 Year-To-Date TN NAS Summary, supra note 19.
42. Letter from John J. Dreyzehner, Comm’r of Tenn. Dep’t of Health to a
Colleague (Nov. 29, 2012), available at http://tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attach
ments/DreyzehnerLetterNASReportable_112912.pdf [hereinafter Commissioner’s
Letter]. Until 2013, Tennessee “rel[ied] upon hospital discharge data to collect
information on NAS incidence.” Id. In particular, data collectors typically relied upon
the presence of the ICD-9 code 779.5. See, e.g., TennCare Enrollees Provisional 2012
Data, supra note 12. In seeking mandatory reporting, the Tennessee Department of
Health hoped to eliminate the delay in reporting and collecting more disaggregated
data. See Commissioner’s Letter, supra note 42.
43. 2013 TN NAS Summary, supra note 19.
44. 2014 TN NAS Summary, supra note 19.
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report NAS births to law enforcement nor does the Department of
Health provide NAS case reports to law enforcement as a matter of
course.45
B. Intertwined Histories: Fetal Rights and Assault Liability
Like many states grappling with skyrocketing NAS births,
Tennessee has tried myriad legal approaches to decrease pregnant
drug use. Addressing pregnant drug use is complicated, both legally
and morally. On the one hand, maternal drug use can harm a fetus
or embryo, and states have both a right and a duty to take
reasonable steps to protect a potential life from such harm. On the
other hand, a pregnant woman also has rights and should be treated
as an end in herself (not as a means). She can have a legitimate need
for Xanax, Hydrocodone, or other drugs that can cause NAS.
Further, even when maternal drug use is not medically indicated,
most experts agree that drug addiction is in large part, if not
entirely, a medical disease.46 In addition, not all maternal drug use
appears to injure a baby and not all maternal drug users suffer from
addiction.47 Under these circumstances, adopting laws that properly
balance prevention, treatment, deterrence, punishment, autonomy,
and privacy is a complex and challenging task.
The history of Tennessee’s assault law over the last thirty years
reflects the sort of ambivalence that combatting pregnant drug use
invokes. Initially, under Tennessee law, assault required harm to
“another person,” a term that was not expressly define by the
legislature.48 This version of the law likely would not have supported
criminal liability against a pregnant woman for drug use that
harmed her fetus. The Tennessee Supreme Court does not appear to
have construed the term “another person” in the context of the
assault law. However, the majority of state courts that have
interpreted criminal laws that only apply if a “person” or “child” is

45. See NAS Law Guidance, supra note 26, at 1–2. Any provider who knows of
or reasonably suspects child abuse or neglect, however, is already required by other
law to make a report to Department of Children’s Services, which in turn
investigates and decides whether or not to involve law enforcement. Id.
46. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 661, 667 n.8 (1962) (stating that
“persons addicted to narcotics are diseased and proper subjects for [medical]
treatment”) (quoting Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Health Expert’s Amicus, supra note 4, at ii
(stating that substance abuse is a treatable disease).
47. NAS Law Guidance, supra note 26.
48. See, e.g., Casey v. State, 491 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tenn. 1972) (defining elements
of assault).
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harmed have interpreted them as excluding harm to the unborn.49
Most courts reason that criminal laws should be strictly construed,
as a matter of due process of law and the need to provide notice of
what conduct is forbidden. These courts hold that the ordinary
meaning of “person” or “child” assumes live birth, absent express
language to the contrary.50 Moreover, utilizing this reasoning, the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly held that
criminal child abuse, neglect, and endangerment laws that require
harm to a “child” do not allow liability for in utero injury caused by
pregnant drug use.51 Accordingly, Tennessee’s initial assault law
would not likely have been construed as allowing liability based on
pregnant drug use.
In 1989, this changed. As part of the “fetal rights” or
“personhood” movement, Tennessee, like many states, amended its
criminal statutes to recognize an unborn fetus as a person.52 Such
laws were passed at least partly in response to the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, in which the Court held
that the term “person” in the U.S. Constitution does not include the

49. See, e.g., State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1223 (Haw. 2005) (holding that
definition of “person” in manslaughter statute did not include a fetus in a case where
mother’s prenatal drug used caused newborn’s death);; Commonwealth v. Welch, 864
S.W.2d 280, 285 (Ky. 1993) (holding that criminal child abuse does not extend to a
mother’s use of drugs while pregnant);; State v. Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195, 1197 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that ordinary meaning of “child” in child abuse statute did
not include fetus in case where mother used cocaine during pregnancy); State v.
Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 711 (Ohio 1992) (holding that criminal child endangerment
does not apply to fetus). But see Hicks v. State, 153 So.3d 53, 54 (Ala. 2014)
(interpreting “child” in criminal chemical-endangerment statute to include unborn);
Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997) (interpreting “person” in criminal
statute to include viable fetus).
50. See, e.g., Aiwohi, 123 P.3d at 1223–24.
51. State v. Hudson, No. M2006-01051-CCA-R9-CO, 2007 WL 1836840, at *1–2
(Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2007) (dismissing criminal child abuse and neglect
indictment based on mother’s prenatal cocaine use, reasoning that the ordinary
meaning of “child” does not include a fetus and that penal statutes are strictly
construed against the state); Richards v. State, No. E2004-02326-CCA-R3-PC,
E2004-02327-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 2138244, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 2005)
(granting post-conviction relief for two mothers who pled guilty to attempted
aggravated child abuse after their infants had positive drug screens at birth because
the women were not advised that they could be guilty of child abuse based on using
drugs during pregnancy); see also Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 13-01 (Feb. 1, 2013)
(advising that a “mother’s drug use . . . does not qualify as criminal child abuse,
neglect, or endangerment . . . because the applicable statutes do not encompass
actions committed against a fetus”).
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (1989).
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unborn.53 In deciding Roe, the Supreme Court relied in part on the
fact that most states did not recognize fetal rights in tort and
criminal law.54 Consequently, in the aftermath of Roe, many states
passed “fetal rights” legislation. Today, a majority of the states
punish feticide and allow recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus.55
In 1989, as a part of this trend, Tennessee—like thirty-seven
other states— enacted a fetal protection assault law.56 Recognizing
the “personhood” of a viable fetus, Tennessee amended its assault
statute to expressly define “another person” to include a viable
fetus.57 While the amendment targeted third parties, the statute’s
broad language would have also likely allowed criminal liability
against a pregnant woman whose illegal drug use caused in utero
harm to a viable fetus, assuming that the prosecution could prove
that her acts were at least reckless.58 The statute did not, however,
expressly address a pregnant woman’s actions with regard to her

53. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973); see Saru Matambanadzo, Embodying
Vulnerability: A Feminist Theory of the Person, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 45, at
57 (exploring the link between Roe v. Wade and the fetal personhood movement).
54. Id.
55. JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 135 (3d ed.
2013); Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 21, at 1 (“[A]t least 38 states have fetal
homicide laws.”).
56. Eckholm, supra note 21 (stating thirty-seven other states have assault
statutes that define a potential victim to include a fetus); Fetal Homicide Laws,
supra note 21, at 1 (“[A]t least 38 states have fetal homicide laws.”).
57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (1989). “Viability” is a vague standard
assessing the potential for fetal survivability and lacks firm definition. Tara CulpRessler, Some 22-Week Old Fetuses Can Now Survive Outside the Womb. How Will
This Affect The Abortion Debate? THINKPROGRESS (May 7, 2015), at 2. Many people
use 24 weeks gestation as a shorthand for viability. Id. However, what likelihood of
survival constitutes “viability” remains a subject of debate, and medical advances
make viability a moving target. Id. at 2–3. Further, “viability” can vary from
individual to individual depending on different biological and technological factors.
Id. Tennessee’s assault statute referred to possible victims as “another person,”
“individuals,” or “another.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (1989). This article refers
only to “another person” for clarity, but the same legal analysis applies to the other
terms.
58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (1989); State v. Condry, No. E2013-01209CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 1912349, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 13, 2014) (holding that
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-107 (Supp. 2012) did not apply retroactively to render
pregnant drug use that harmed baby in utero non-criminal, affirming conviction
against mother for aggravated assault);; Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 08-114 (May 21,
2008) (concluding that a mother could be criminally liable for assault based on
ingestion of an illegal drug that injures her viable fetus in utero, with the requisite
showing of causation and culpable mental state).
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own fetus.59 Accordingly, a pregnant woman may have made
plausible, though difficult, arguments that the statute was not
intended to apply to her or could not constitutionally apply to her.60
Then, in 2011, Tennessee went further, joining twenty-two other
states in punishing criminal conduct that causes injury prior to
viability.61 Effective July 1, 2011, Tennessee amended its assault
statute to allow criminal liability based on injury to a “fetus,”
“regardless of viability.”62 Still silent on its face in regard to a
pregnant woman, this version of Tennessee’s assault statute also
could have been interpreted to impose criminal liability on a
pregnant woman whose reckless drug use caused in utero harm.63
After the amendment, however, potential criminal liability began
much earlier—approximately nine weeks after fertilization when an
embryo becomes a “fetus.”64 At this early point in the pregnancy, a
pregnant woman has a constitutional right to obtain an abortion
under current law.65 Yet, no Tennessee court appears to have
addressed any potential right to privacy issues raised by previability assault liability for conduct while pregnant.66
One year later, Tennessee adopted an even more expansive view
of “personhood” and fetal protection.67 Specifically, Tennessee

59. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (1989).
60. For example, some courts have focused on the fact that NAS arises from
“the withdrawal of drugs” after birth “rather than the absorption of . . . drugs” in
utero to avoid criminal liability against the mother. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Welch, 864 S.W.2d. 280, 282–83 (Ky. 1993).
61. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 21, at 1 (“At least 23 states have fetal
homicide laws that apply to the earliest stages of pregnancy (any state of gestation,
conception, fertilization or post-fertilization).”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (Supp. 2011).
63. Id.; Condry, 2014 WL 1912349, at *2.
64. JAYNE KLOSSNER & NANCY HATFIELD, INTRODUCTORY MATERNITY &
PEDIATRIC NURSING 103 (Elizabeth Nieginski et al. eds. 2006) (“The fetal stage is
from the beginning of the 9th week after fertilization and continues until birth.”).
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(c) (2014) (exempting abortion from criminal
liability pre-viability when statutory requirements are satisfied); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (holding that a state may
regulate abortion pre-viability, as long as the regulation does not pose an “undue
burden”);; see also Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 4
(Tenn. 2000) (recognizing a woman’s right to obtain an abortion) (abrogated in part
with regard to interpretation of the Tennessee Constitution by a November 2014
amendment to the Tennessee Constitution).
66. While this article does not focus on potential constitutional concerns,
holding a pregnant woman to heightened standards of conduct from conception
onward arguably raises serious autonomy and right to privacy issues.
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (Supp. 2012). In fact, “fetal protection”
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amended its assault statute to allow criminal liability based on
injury to “another person,” defined as an “embryo or fetus at any
stage of gestation.”68 While there is some debate regarding whether
implantation of an egg is required in order to be considered an
“embryo,” this definition of “another person” arguably moves
potential criminal liability to a point as early as conception.69 At the
same time, however, Tennessee also expressly exempted a pregnant
woman from assault liability based on any act or omission that
injured her own embryo or fetus.70 Therefore, a pregnant woman no
longer faced potential assault liability for personal drug use. This
reprieve proved to be short-lived.
II. LAW EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZES PROSECUTING PREGNANT DRUG
USERS FOR ASSAULT
In a controversial bill, effective April 28, 2014, Tennessee again
amended its criminal assault statute, this time to expressly
authorize prosecution of a pregnant woman based on illegal drug use
or any other unlawful act or omission that harms her embryo or
fetus.71 Specifically, Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-107 now provides:
(a) For the purposes of this part, “another,” “individuals,” and
“another person” include a human embryo or fetus at any
stage of gestation in utero, when any such term refers to the
victim of any act made criminal by this part.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to amend the
provisions of § 39-15-201, or §§ 39-15-203–39-15-205 and 3915-207.

becomes a misnomer, as Tennessee and several other states apply legal protection to
an embryo that is not yet a fetus.
68. Id.; 2012 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 1006, §§ 3–4.
69. Compare MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2014), available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/embryo (last visited Dec. 15, 2015)
(defining an embryo “from the time of implantation to the end of the eighth week
after conception”) (emphasis added), with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining an embryo “from conception until the development of organs (i.e., until
about the eighth week of pregnancy)”) (emphasis added).
70. 2012 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 1006, §§ 3–4 (codified as amended at TENN. CODE
ANN. 39-13-107 (2015)) (exempting from criminal liability “any act or omission by a
pregnant woman with respect to an embryo or fetus with which she is pregnant”);; see
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c) (2013); Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 13-01 (February 1,
2013) (abrogating Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 08-114 (May 21, 2008)).
71. Legislators also proposed a similar bill to amend the homicide statute,
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-214, to allow felony prosecution of pregnant women for drug
use that causes the death of a fetus or embryo, but that bill was not adopted.
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(1) Nothing in subsection (a) shall apply to any lawful act
or lawful omission by a pregnant woman with respect to
an embryo or fetus with which she is pregnant, or to any
lawful medical or surgical procedure to which a pregnant
woman consents, performed by a health care professional
who is licensed to perform such procedure.
(2) Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(1), nothing in this
section shall preclude prosecution of a woman for assault
under § 39–13–101 for the illegal use of a narcotic drug,
as defined in § 39–17–402, while pregnant, if her child is
born addicted to or harmed by the narcotic drug and the
addiction or harm is a result of her illegal use of a
narcotic drug taken while pregnant.
(3) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution permitted
by subdivision (c)(2) that the woman actively enrolled in
an addiction recovery program before the child is born,
remained in the program after delivery, and successfully
completed the program, regardless of whether the child
was born addicted to or harmed by the narcotic drug.

Tennessee’s amended law immediately drew attention
nationally, even globally, and received almost unanimous criticism
for further criminalizing pregnant drug use.72 A scholarly analysis of
this statute reveals that the law rests on a fundamentally flawed
understanding of the relationship between mother and baby.
Moreover, the law is poorly designed because it ignores prescription
drug use—the primary driver of NAS births—and offers only an
illusory affirmative defense that does not provide any meaningful
opportunity for women to obtain drug treatment. Further, the
amended law criminalizes undefined, unlawful acts.
A. Personhood, Abortion, and Criminal Liability for Assault
Imposed On a Pregnant Woman at “Any Stage of Gestation”
Tennessee’s amended assault statute is fatally flawed because it
rests on the legal fiction of fetal personhood. Specifically, the law
defines “another person” to include an “embryo or fetus at any stage
of gestation.”73 This definition of “person” reflects the reverence

72. See, e.g., Lindsay Beyerstein, Bad Medicine in Tennessee for Pregnant and
Drug-Addicted Women, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/art
icles/2014/9/30/tennessee-new-lawsb1391.html; Deborah Coughlin, Pregnant Women
Addicted to Alcohol Need Help, Not Criminal Sanctions; Another Voice,
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 6, 2014, at 36; Eckholm, supra note 21.
73. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(a) (2014).
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many feel for an embryo.74 While this definition may be appropriate
for harms inflicted by a third party, it raises much more complicated
issues when a pregnant woman is charged based on the potential
effect of her actions on an embryo that is a part of her person.75 After
all, despite the merits of legally recognizing the value of even
embryonic life, embryonic personhood is a fiction. It is factually false
because an embryo exists only as part of the woman who carries it.76
A legal framework that treats as separate and independent a
pregnant woman and her embryo—a dyad that factually is
thoroughly intertwined—distorts the relationship in ways that are
both harmful and unjust.77 It undervalues and attempts to rewrite
the natural, beautiful, miraculous oneness of a pregnant woman and
her embryo.78 It immorally treats a pregnant woman as a vessel—a
means to an end rather than an end.79 It creates an adversarial

74. This article takes no position on the interesting and difficult moral question
of when a zygote, embryo, or fetus becomes a “person” in the full rights-bearing
sense. On a personal, experiential note, I loved my son deeply from the time I
learned I was expecting. On a policy basis, however, the view of personhood
ultimately expressed by the Tennessee legislature in its assault statute, if applied
consistently, would prohibit common, in vitro fertilization practices, embryonic stem
cell research, and possibly intra-uterine devices in ways that do not resonate with
many Americans.
75. Interestingly, the “at any stage of gestation” language in Tennessee’s
statute parallels language in the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act that
criminalizes certain conduct causing harm to the unborn at “any stage of
development.” 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012). However, the federal act expressly exempts a
woman with regard to her own unborn child. Id.
76. See American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Committee on
Health Care for Underserved Women, Maternal Decision Making, Ethics, and the
Law, ACOG (Nov. 2005), http://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/
Committee-on-Ethics/co321.pdf? [hereinafter ACOG Ethics Opinion].
77. Id.
78. While pregnant, there is only a “we.” Rene Descartes’ well known cogito
ergo sum, “I think, therefore I am,” thought exercise, applied personally, reflects this
intertwined oneness with simplicity. Normally, I crave red meat daily. While
pregnant, I cannot stand the thought of red meat. The “I” that thinks while expecting
is different than my normal “I.” Pregnancy temporarily alters sense of self; while
pregnant there is only a “we.”
79. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS §
4:412 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998); April L. Cherry,
Shifting Focus from Retribution to Social Justice: An Alternative Vision for the
Treatment of Pregnant Women Who Harm Their Fetuses, 28 J. L. & HEALTH 6, 50–52
(2015); ACOG Ethics Opinion, supra note 76. Legislation that approaches an embryo
as a separate and independent legal being from its mother, and uses this legal fiction
to criminally charge a pregnant woman for her conduct during pregnancy calls to
mind Margaret Atwood’s novel about a dystopian monotheocracy, THE HANDMAID’S
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relationship, when in reality a mother and her infant’s interests are
almost always interrelated.80
Moreover, as written, Tennessee’s statute allows assault charges
to be brought against a pregnant woman at the very earliest embryo
stage when she still has a constitutional right to obtain an
abortion.81 As discussed in greater detail below, this creates a
perverse and seemingly unacceptable incentive for a pregnant
woman who has used drugs to obtain an abortion pre-viability.82
Tennessee’s broad definition of “person” also raises the very real
possibility of charging a woman who does not know that she is
pregnant with assault for conduct that would not be “reckless” with
regard to injuring a third party who is not in utero. While largely
beyond the scope of this article, such a framework raises difficult
concerns regarding autonomy, equal protection, fairness, and due
process.83
Because Tennessee’s statute rests on the fiction of fetal
personhood while ignoring the interconnected relationship between
mother and baby, both in utero and during the baby’s first years, the
law is practically and morally flawed.84

TALE, in which the main character, Offred, laments, “We are two-legged wombs,
that’s all: sacred vessels, ambulatory chalices.” MARGARET ATWOOD, THE
HANDMAID’S TALE 136 (Houghton Mifflin 1986).
80. ACOG Ethics Opinion, supra note 76.
81. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833, 870
(1992).
82. This problem would be ameliorated by returning to the 1989 definition of
“another person” in Section 107(a), which only applied to a viable fetus. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-107(a) (1989). Some concern regarding the incentive to abort would
remain, however, because pregnant drug users may be aware of the statute and
potential criminal liability but not that liability was limited to after viability. The
incentive to abort would also remain troubling because some pregnant drug users
may abort pre-viability out of concern that they will be unable to stop using drugs
after viability.
83. See, e.g., Tiffany Lyttle, Stop the Injustice: A Protest against the
Unconstitutional Punishment of Pregnant Drug-Addicted Women, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 781, 783 (2006); John E.B. Myers, A Limited Role for the Legal System
in Responding to Maternal Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 747, 761 (1991) (stating that prosecuting mothers for drug use
affects their right to procreative privacy).
84. April Cherry, commenting on an article by Seema Mohapatra, has an
interesting discussion of why we should focus on the health and welfare of the
pregnant woman for her own sake rather than as a means to ensure better fetal
health. Cherry, supra note 79, at 50; see Seema Mohapatra, Unshackling Addiction:
A Public Health Approach to Drug Use During Pregnancy, 26 WISC. J.L. GENDER &
SOC’Y 241, 253 (2011). I agree that a pregnant woman ought to be treated as an end
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B. Ignoring the Primary Driver of Increasing NAS Births
Tennessee’s law is also poorly targeted for its stated purpose.
Legislators claim that criminalizing pregnant drug use is necessary
to respond to a rising epidemic of NAS births. However, the
explosion of NAS births in Tennessee—as is also the case in
Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, Maine, New Hampshire, West
Virginia, and Florida—appears to be driven by prescription drug
use.85 Statistics show that approximately two-thirds of NAS births in
Tennessee are linked to at least one legally prescribed drug.86
Almost half of NAS births in Tennessee are due exclusively to legally
prescribed drugs.87

in herself, that states should take a public health approach, and that rhetoric
matters. Nonetheless, because a primary goal of this article is to influence openminded legislators primarily concerned with protecting the unborn, the article often
and necessarily focuses on how treatment of a pregnant woman impacts her baby.
Such a focus is not intended to rob the pregnant woman of her instrumentality, but
rather to illustrate that the relationship between mother and baby are interrelated
to such an extent that the policy approach should be the same with either focus.
85. Associated Health Care Expenditures, supra note 8, at 1937 (noting
temporal correlation between rise in prescription drug use and NAS births); see also
Geographic Distribution of NAS, supra note 9, at 653 (“The rapid rise in NAS
parallels the increase in [opioid pain reliever] use in the United States, suggesting
that preventing opioid overuse and misuse, especially before pregnancy, may prevent
NAS.”);; Toila et al., supra note 9, at 2119 (noting the rising incidence of NAS due to
increasing opioid use among pregnant women).
86. Infant Outcomes, supra note 11, at 846 (“65% of infants with NAS were
exposed to legally obtained [opioid pain relievers] in pregnancy.”);; 2013 TN NAS
Summary, supra note 19 (sixty-three percent of NAS births had at least one
prescribed substance linked to NAS); 2014 TN NAS Summary, supra note 19, at 14
(sixty-nine percent of NAS births had at least one prescribed substance linked to
NAS); 2015 Year-To-Date TN NAS Summary, supra note 19 (seventy-five percent
NAS births had at least one prescribed substance linked to NAS).
When at least one legally prescribed drug could have caused the NAS, but
the pregnant woman also used another “diverted” or “illicit” substance during
pregnancy, it may be unclear whether legal or illegal drug use caused NAS. If a
pregnant woman has access to robust legal representation, with sufficient resources
to hire a compelling expert, the law should not result in liability in these cases. After
all, prosecutors bear the burden of proof that the newborn’s harm is “a result of” the
mother’s illegal narcotic use while pregnant. This burden should be difficult to meet
when a health care provider prescribed the mother at least one substance that
causes NAS. Assuming a pregnant woman who has taken a legally prescribed drug
linked to NAS will typically not face liability, only roughly 1/3 of pregnant women
who deliver babies diagnosed with NAS remain vulnerable to criminal liability under
the new law.
87. 2013 TN NAS Summary, supra note 19 (reporting that 42.3% were only
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Likely, the impact of legally prescribed drugs on NAS births is
even greater than one-half to two-thirds of all NAS births. Many
women become addicted to legally prescribed drugs first and later
switch to heroin or another illicit substance that is cheaper and
easier to obtain.88 If this switch occurs prior to pregnancy, the NAS
birth would not be listed as attributable to legally prescribed drugs,
despite the fact that the legally prescribed drugs caused the
underlying addiction.89
Yet, the amended assault statute only authorizes charges if a
woman uses an illegal “narcotic” while pregnant and thereby harms
her baby.90 It does not criminalize the use of legal drugs that might
injure a baby, such as alcohol, tobacco, or prescription drugs.91
Because the statute ignores the leading cause of the burgeoning NAS

using prescribed substances); 2014 TN NAS Summary, supra note 19, at 16
(reporting that 46.6% were only using prescribed substances); 2015 Year-To-Date TN
NAS Summary, supra note 19 (reporting that 41.3% were only using prescribed
substances).
88. Todd Barnes, Report: TN’s Uninsured, Pill Scripts Linked to Heroin Abuse,
TENNESSEAN, July 15, 2015, at 5A (many drug users first become addicted to legally
prescribed narcotics and only later switch to illegal drugs like heroin because heroin
is cheaper and easier to obtain) (citing 2015 report from the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention). Experts estimate that seventy-five percent of heroin users
first became addicted to prescription drugs. Id.
89. It is unclear the extent to which the rampant prescription drug use in
Tennessee begins with the patient innocently being prescribed a drug to treat a
legitimate medical problem, from which the patient is simply unable to wean herself.
In some instances, even the initial legally prescribed drug may stem from less
innocent behavior whereby the patient intentionally seeks the drug primarily for a
high. Either way, Tennessee’s amended statute does absolutely nothing to curtail the
legally prescribed drug use driving the increase in NAS births.
90. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (2014). “Narcotic” is defined by
reference to TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402 and appears to include opiate and cocaine
based drugs but not marijuana or methamphetamine. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402
(2010). While Tennessee legislators introduced bills in 2015 that would expand the
assault statute to include methamphetamine, HB 1340 and SB 586, to date such
expansion has not passed. H.B. 1340, 109th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2015); S.B. 586,
109th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2015).
91. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(1)–(2). However, Section 107(c)(1), which is
broader than Section (c)(2), may still provide a basis for prosecution of an under-age
pregnant woman whose alcohol or tobacco use harms her baby since such act is not
“lawful.” Id.; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1505 (2014) (unlawful for person under
age 18 to possess, purchase or accept tobacco); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-412(3)(A)–(C)
(2014) (stating that it is unlawful for person under age 21 to possess or consume
alcohol). Health experts typically categorize neonatal harm caused by alcohol (fetal
alcohol syndrome) or tobacco separately from NAS. See, e.g., TennCare Enrollees
Provisional 2012 Data, supra note 12.
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crisis—legally prescribed prescription drugs—it cannot and will not
reverse the incidence of NAS births.92
Criminalizing pregnant drug use is bad public policy for the
reasons discussed below; therefore, the narrower the law the better.
However, Tennessee’s law is poorly targeted if the goal is to reduce
NAS births. The law does nothing to address the primary cause of
NAS births—prescription drugs—and the high rate of unintended

92. Even in the remaining third of NAS births, prosecutors may find it difficult
to criminally convict a pregnant woman whose drug use causes in utero harm. First,
to the extent these cases involve illegal drugs that are not narcotics, like marijuana
or methamphetamine, Section 107(c)(2) does not authorize liability. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(17) (2014) (defining
“narcotic”).
Second, to the extent a woman reasonably does not know that she is
pregnant, the statute probably does not provide for liability. Assault is a specific
intent offense, requiring prosecutors to prove that a mother “intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly” caused bodily injury. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101(a)(1) (2014). Under
Tennessee law, a woman acts recklessly when she “consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-302(c) (2014). “The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise . . . .” Id. Sometimes a risk is not imminent or
substantial enough to make consciously disregarding it a “reckless” act. A woman
who reasonably does not know she is pregnant when she uses drugs does not
consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to her fetus or
embryo. In this regard, a drug user who reasonably does not know she is pregnant is
different from a defendant who does not know her driving under the influence will
cause an accident, as personal drug use does not endanger another unless one is
pregnant.
Third, to the extent that many of the remaining cases involve “diverted”
narcotics, prosecutors may be unable to prove the required intent. While use of illicit
drugs may often meet the recklessness requirement, the case is much less clear for
diverted narcotics. A pregnant woman who takes a prescription drug without a valid
prescription may do so because she lacks the ability to visit a physician. After all,
ninety-three percent of reported NAS cases in Tennessee [could not find data to
support this figure], and seventy-eight percent nationwide involve a woman who
lives in poverty, and many are uninsured. Associated Health Care Expenditures,
supra note 8, at 1936. For these women, self-medicating may be the only financially
feasible health care. Moreover, these women may, somewhat understandably, believe
that the diverted drugs are safe—especially if they have previously been prescribed
them. A pregnant woman who suffers anxiety and takes Xanax to manage her
condition cannot be prosecuted if she can afford to visit a physician. Perhaps then, a
poor, pregnant woman with the same medical condition who treats the condition
with the same drug does not “consciously disregard” a “substantial and unjustifiable”
risk. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-302(c) (2014). So, while troubling for the reasons
outlined below, Tennessee’s law is circumscribed by the limitation to illegal narcotics
and by the evidentiary difficulty of establishing causation and intent.
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pregnancy in connection with prescription drug use.93 It also does
nothing to increase the availability of drug treatment, which is
essential to effectively combat the remaining NAS births.94
C. The Illusory Affirmative Defense Fails to Account for Lack of
Available, Affordable, and Appropriate Treatment
1. The Affirmative Defense Should Protect Women Who Seek
Treatment, Not Only Those Able to Obtain It
Without expressly acknowledging that the law is poorly targeted
to address the vast majority of NAS births, the sponsors of
Tennessee’s new law claim that the law targets “the worst of the
worst.”95 The pregnant women desperately seeking drug treatment,
then still being prosecuted pursuant to the law, belie this assertion.
Under Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-107(c)(3), if a pregnant woman can
establish that she is enrolled in an addiction recovery program

93. Infant Outcomes, supra note 11, at 848 (“Public health efforts should focus
on limiting inappropriate [opioid pain relievers] . . . .”);; see also Heil, supra note 12,
at 200 (noting that eighty-six percent of women who abuse opioids report that their
pregnancy is unplanned); TennCare Enrollees Provisional 2012 Data, supra note 12
(noting that eighty-two percent of women prescribed narcotics are not on
contraceptives). In separate legislation, Tennessee has taken some positive steps to
address the prescription drug crisis. In particular, the Tennessee Prescription Safety
Act of 2012 now requires prescribers to report narcotic prescriptions and to check the
statewide Controlled Substance Monitoring Database before writing an opioid
prescription in most cases. TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-10-302 (2012). Similarly,
Tennessee has established dispensing limits on many narcotics, limiting patients to a
30-day supply. TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11-308(e) (2014). Further, the legislature
recently passed the 2015 Opioid Abuse Reduction Act, requiring the Department of
Mental Health and Substance Abuse to convene a working group on the problem of
opioid abuse. See H.B. 0403, 109th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2015); S.B. 0570, 109th Gen.
Assemb. (Tenn. 2015). Moreover, the governor’s “Prescription for Success,” if fully
implemented, would positively impact public health. The difficulty, of course, is that
the Prescription for Success is not fully funded, and the legislative initiatives, while
promising, do not go far enough. Tom Wilemon, Tennessee Fails to Up Ante for Drug
Treatment,
TENNESSEAN,
Nov.
27,
2014,
available
at
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/health/2014/11/27/tennessee-fails-ante-drugtreatment/70111366/ (despite announcing Prescription for Success, new budget
contains no additional money for addiction treatment and less funds for support
services).
94. Health Expert’s Amicus, supra note 4, at 6–8 (opining that pregnant drug
users need treatment, not jail); AAP Position, supra note 4, at 640–41 (opining that
pregnant drug users need treatment, not jail); ACOG Ethics Opinion, supra note 76,
at 6–8 (opining that pregnant drug users need treatment, not jail).
95. Statement of Representative Weaver, supra note 1.
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before her child was born, remained in the program after delivery,
and successfully completed the program, she has a valid affirmative
defense.96 However, this defense does not protect a pregnant woman
who seeks treatment but is unable to receive treatment due to a lack
of available, affordable, or appropriate treatment options.
Addiction treatment options for pregnant women are extremely
limited, costly, and nearly non-existent.97 Like in many states, “only
2 of Tennessee’s 177 addiction treatment facilities provide prenatal
care on site and allow older children to stay with their mothers.”98
Only 19 provide any addiction care for a pregnant woman, and only
5 of these accept TennCare.99 Moreover, the distance between a
woman seeking treating and a treatment facility, even when the
treatment is otherwise available and affordable, often proves an
insurmountable obstacle. In September 2014, there were fewer than
50 beds available to treat poor pregnant drug users statewide—an
embarrassing shortfall relative to the almost 1,000 pregnant women
who gave birth to a baby diagnosed with NAS that year.100
Perhaps, nothing captures the lack of available, affordable drug
treatment as well as the experience of one pregnant woman seeking
help:

96. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(3) (2014).
97. AAP Position, supra note 4, at 640–41 (noting that the demand for
treatment “far exceeds supply”);; Gonzalez, supra note 41 (stating that since passage
of the law, “little [has been] done to expand addiction treatment services”);; Gonzalez
& DuBois, supra note 20 (“Addiction treatment is extremely limited and costly—and
nearly nonexistent for pregnant women.”);; see also SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
RESULTS FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY
OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 7 (2014) [hereinafter National Drug Survey] (reporting that
in 2013 alone, 316,000 Americans tried and failed to obtain substance abuse
treatment, most commonly due to lack of insurance coverage and affordability);
Christopher M. Jones, et al., National and State Treatment Need and Capacity for
Opioid Agonist Medication-Assisted Treatment, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, vol. 8 e55,
e55 (“Significant gaps between treatment need and capacity exist at the state and
national levels.”).
98. Scott, supra note 20.
99. Id.; Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 26 (noting that only 5 treatment
centers accept TennCare).
100. Dosani, supra note 20 (reporting fewer than 50 beds in Tennessee are
available to treat pregnant drug users); Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 26
(reporting fewer than 50 beds in Tennessee are available to treat pregnant drug
users); 2014 TN NAS Summary, supra note 19 (reporting 973 NAS births in
Tennessee in 2014).
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For months, she and her mother tried every clinic and
hospital they could find—about thirty by the time [Carmen]
Wolf was due. “We had numbers and places written
horizontally and diagonally across papers every which way,”
Wolf recalled. “Everything is unorganized, because we were
in such a hurry to get help.” Almost all of the centers told her
no flat out, citing liability issues. . . . Only one center would
take her in, but she would have to pay [$3,000 up front]
first.101
In fact, several of the women who have been charged under the
new law report that they sought treatment during pregnancy but
were turned away repeatedly by facilities that did not accept
pregnant women, did not accept TennCare or that were full.102
Clearly, these women seeking treatment are not “the worst of the
worst,”103 yet the law ensnares them.
At the very least, the law’s affirmative defense should be
expanded to protect pregnant women that seek treatment, not only
those that successfully obtain it.104 Given the fact that the demand
for treatment greatly exceeds the supply of suitable treatment
options,105 there is no reasonable basis upon which to punish a
woman who seeks help. Such an approach serves no deterrent
purpose (as the woman cannot control the treatment options
available to her), and it is manifestly unfair to punish a woman for
the state’s lack of available, affordable, and appropriate treatment.
2. The Affirmative Defense Should Protect Women Who Complete
Treatment, Even If They Enroll After Giving Birth
The affirmative defense’s unrealistic timing further compounds
the lack of adequate supply, unaffordability, and other barriers to

101. Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 26 (quoting Carmen Wolf regarding
her experience in Tennessee seeking drug treatment while pregnant in 2014).
102. Id. (reporting Brittany Hudson and Jamillah Fall separately being turned
away from multiple treatment centers and Carmen Wolf seeking treatment at thirty
centers without success).
103. Statement of Representative Weaver, supra note 1, at 5:14:32 (exhibiting
the contrast between the intent of Tennessee’s law and its actual effect).
104. This result could be accomplished by amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13107(c)(3) (2014) to read: “It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution permitted by
subdivision (c)(2) that the woman actively sought enrollment in an addiction recovery
program before the child was born, regardless of whether the child was born addicted
to or harmed by the narcotic drug.”
105. AAP Position, supra note 4, at 640–41 (stating that demand for voluntary
drug treatment far exceeds supply).
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treatment. The defense only applies if a pregnant woman finds and
enrolls in treatment prior to birth.106 For pregnant women using
drugs, the time between discovering the pregnancy and delivery is
usually less than six months—often much less.107 In most cases, this
provides insufficient time to find and begin treatment before birth.108
Thus, the affirmative defense is illusory, allowing legislators and
voters to believe that any woman willing to accept treatment can
avoid criminal charges, while such treatment is generally
unavailable, especially within the timeframe required by the statute.
Moreover, several of the women charged under the statute to
date were only charged after birth, at which time it is already too
late to avoid a penalty by obtaining drug treatment.109 If the goal of

106. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(3) (2014).
107. Heil, supra note 12, at 200. Eighty-six percent of women who abuse opioids
report that their pregnancy is unplanned. Id. Unplanned pregnancies tend to be
discovered later in the pregnancy, and this problem is often worse when a woman is
using drugs. Drug use may disrupt her menstrual cycle or otherwise mask the
pregnancy, leaving little time to find and arrange for treatment. See Linda C.
Fentiman, Rethinking Addiction: Drugs, Deterrence, and the Neuroscience
Revolution, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 233, 255–56 (2011).
108. See Fentiman, supra note 107, at 258 (“[T]he need for treatment is
immediate, yet historically, many women have had difficulty in obtaining a ‘slot’ in
any treatment program . . . .”). Ironically, one legislator argued in favor of the law,
recognizing the lack of available, affordable treatment, as a way to provide a
pregnant woman access to drug court programs and thereby affordable treatment.
See S.B. 1391, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014, 46:07)
(statement of Sen. Reginald Tate), available at http://tnga.granicus.com/Media
Player.php?view_id=269&clip_iid=9225&meta_id=174300. Needless to say, there are
more helpful ways to provide access to affordable drug treatment than through
criminal liability. In fact, in addition to expanding access to affordable treatment, in
order to curtail NAS births, states also need to greatly improve communication
regarding existing services. Tennessee already is one of eleven states that gives
pregnant women priority access to all treatment programs that accept them. STATE
POLICIES, supra note 2, at 2.
109. Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 26–27 (describing instances of postdelivery arrest). In addition to being unrealistically short, the affirmative defense’s
timing also fails to provide an incentive for treatment once a woman knows she will
face liability. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(3) (2014). Some studies suggest
that as few as fifty-five percent of neonates with in utero narcotic exposure may
develop NAS. Hudek, supra note 26, at 541; see also NAS Law Guidance, supra note
26, at 1 (“Not all cases of exposure will lead to withdrawal syndrome.”). So, a woman
may not know if she faces liability until after birth. As drafted, once a baby is born
with NAS, it is too late to avoid penalty by seeking drug treatment, even though
successful treatment after birth has a materially positive impact on the baby and the
mother. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(3) (2014); see also AMA Position, supra
note 4, at 2669 (indicating that treatment “facilitates a more emotionally positive
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the statute is to couple the “carrot” of preferential placement for
pregnant women in drug treatment programs with the “stick” of jail
time if a woman refuses treatment, the “stick” should only apply
after the woman has had an opportunity to receive treatment and
refused. The law’s affirmative defense should be expanded to protect
a woman who is willing to complete treatment once it is offered to
her, even if that opportunity arises for the first time after birth.110
As drafted, the illusory affirmative defense perpetuates the myth
that pregnant drug users are being offered help and refusing it. In
reality, even without the threat of assault charges, the demand for
drug treatment among pregnant women greatly exceeds the supply
of available drug treatment.111 The problem is often not pregnant
drug users’ lack of desire to obtain help, but rather the existence of
available, affordable treatment. As long as the demand for treatment
continues to exceed the supply of available treatment, there is
absolutely no way that criminalizing pregnant drug use will increase
the number of pregnant women receiving drug treatment or decrease
the number of NAS births. At a minimum, the affirmative defense
should be amended to protect any woman who accepts available
treatment.112
D. An Underreported Amendment Creates Broad,
Undefined Liability
While the further criminalization of illegal narcotic use has
received most of the attention, the amended language of Tenn. Code

relationship after birth”). By limiting the “carrot” contained in the affirmative
defense to a pregnant woman “actively enrolled” in drug treatment before delivery,
the law provides no incentive for treatment by the time a woman knows she faces
liability.
110. This result could be accomplished by amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13107(c)(3) to read: “It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution permitted by
subdivision (c)(2) that the woman successfully completed an addiction recovery
program, regardless of whether the child was born addicted to or harmed by the
narcotic drug. Any woman charged under subdivision (c)(2) must be offered
affordable placement in an addiction recovery program, with the opportunity to
satisfy this affirmative defense.”
111. Scott, supra note 20 (“Only two of Tennessee’s 177 addiction treatment
facilities provide prenatal care on site . . . and only 19 provide any addiction care for
pregnant women.”).
112. While a significant improvement that would increase the statute’s
fairness—even a robust affirmative defense as proposed in the footnote above—
would not cure many of criminalization’s ills. See ACOG Substance Abuse Opinion,
supra note 4, at 2 (stating that “use of the legal system to address” NAS is simply
“inappropriate”).
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Ann. §39-13-107(c)(1) is also troubling. The broad, undefined
language of this section could be used to prosecute a pregnant
woman for any act or omission that harms her embryo or fetus,
unless such act or omission is “lawful.”113 One of the arguments
against criminalizing illegal drug use by pregnant women is and has
always been the “slippery slope.”114 The concern is that if the state
criminalizes pregnant drug use, it might also eventually criminalize
pregnant smoking, exercising too much, or even the failure to eat
and sleep as recommended. Section Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13107(c)(1) raises the very real specter of abusive prosecution of
pregnant women for a wide range of conduct.115
When Tennessee first amended its assault statute to expressly
include an “embryo or fetus at any stage of gestation,” it carved out
an exception for pregnant women with regard to their own embryo or
fetus.116 After the 2014 amendment, however, a prosecutor may
charge a pregnant woman with assault based on any reckless act or
omission that harms her embryo or fetus, unless the act or omission
is “lawful.”117 The addition of the word “lawful” dramatically
narrows the exemption.
While at first blush requiring pregnant women to behave
“lawfully” may not seem draconian, the possibility of a woman being
called into court to defend her behavior when she miscarries or
delivers a baby with a fetal abnormality is both real and troubling.118

113. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(1) (2014).
114. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d. 280, 283 (Ky. 1993)
(expressing concern regarding the slippery slope of charging a pregnant woman).
115. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(1) (2014). In fact, Section 107(c)(1)
arguably provides a basis for prosecution of an under-age pregnant woman whose
alcohol or tobacco use harms her baby since such act is not “lawful.” See TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-1505 (2014) (unlawful for person under age eighteen to possess,
purchase or accept tobacco); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-412(3)(A)-(C) (2013) (unlawful
for any person under age twenty-one to possess or consume alcohol).
116. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (a), (c) (Supp. 2012); 2012 Tenn. Pub. Acts
1006, §§ 2, 4–5.
117. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(1) (2014) (“Nothing in subsection (a) shall
apply to any lawful act or lawful omission by a pregnant woman with respect to an
embryo or fetus with which she is pregnant . . . ”) (emphasis added).
118. The broad scope of section 107(c)(1) may also create an internal
inconsistency—a “lesser” illegal drug like marijuana could pose a greater risk of
criminal liability than the illegal narcotics the statute targets. See TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-17-415 (2014) (classifying marijuana as a Schedule VI controlled substance).
After all, unlike section 107(c)(2), a pregnant woman charged under section 107(c)(1)
has no affirmative defense. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(3) (2014). Because
marijuana use is less likely to harm a baby in utero, it is hard to imagine a
compelling rationale for treating a pregnant woman who uses marijuana more
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Speeding, failing to wear a seat belt, and texting while driving, while
quite common, are not “lawful.” If such conduct contributes to a car
accident in which an embryo or fetus is harmed, the pregnant
woman could be charged with assault.119 While liability for assault
should be limited by the specific intent requirement, the trauma of
facing prosecution may not be.120
Moreover, any such prosecutions reinforce the already damaging
notion that a woman is at fault if her baby is not perfect. Pregnancy
is an incredible gift but also a long, trying, and stressful time for
many. A pregnant woman should not be held to unrealistic
standards of conduct that threaten to turn relatively minor
infractions into criminal assault. Broad laws criminalizing undefined
conduct, like Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-107(c)(1), unfairly burden a
pregnant woman and leave far too much discretion to prosecutors.121
The language of the statute should be returned to its pre-2014
amendment form.122

harshly than a pregnant woman who uses cocaine or heroin. See AAP Position, supra
note 4, at 639 (stating that withdrawal from marijuana “does not appear to result in
as severe a syndrome of abstinence as withdraw from narcotics”);; Peter A. Fried, The
Consequences of Marijuana Use During Pregnancy: A Review of the Human
Literature, 2 J. CANNABIS THERAPEUTICS 85, 99 (2002) (finding no increased risk of
NAS after marijuana use); Eran Kozer & Gideon Koren, Effects of Prenatal Exposure
to Marijuana, 47 CAN. FAM. PHYSICIAN 263, 263 (2001) (finding no increased risk of
NAS after marijuana use). Yet, the statute could arguably be interpreted to do so.
Of course, this internal inconsistency could be avoided by reading the statute as a
whole to exclude liability for non-narcotic illegal drug use (or relying on the
legislative history to reach this same result). This is without question the better
statutory interpretation. Nonetheless, the tension in the language illustrated by this
example remains. Pursuant to section 107(c)(1), undefined, possibly less pernicious
conduct by a pregnant woman could result in assault liability with no affirmative
defense.
119. See, e.g., Eckholm, supra note 21 (reflecting concern that pregnant women
could be charged for harm relating to relatively minor driving offenses); Goldensohn
& Levy, supra note 20, at 28 (reflecting concern that pregnant women could be
charged for harm relating to relatively minor driving offenses).
120. See Linda C. Fentiman, In the Name of Fetal Protection: Why American
Prosecutors Pursue Pregnant Drug Users (and Other Countries Don’t), 18 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 647, 665–68 (2009) (discussing the dangers of prosecutorial discretion
with regard to pregnant women).
121. Id. at 666–67.
122. Specifically:
(c) Nothing in subsection (a) shall apply to any act or omission by
pregnant woman with respect to an embryo or fetus with which she
pregnant, or to any lawful medical or surgical procedure to which
pregnant woman consents, performed by a health care professional who
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In summary, Tennessee’s new law criminalizing illegal narcotic
use by pregnant women is inherently flawed because it ignores the
scientific and medical facts: the interconnected relationship between
mother and baby, the reality that prescription drugs drive the
majority of NAS births, as well as the empirical data that in
Tennessee the demand for drug treatment for pregnant women
already greatly exceeds the available supply.
III. CRIMINALIZING PREGNANT DRUG USE FAILS TO SERVE
CRIMINAL LAW OBJECTIVES
Having analyzed the contours of the first law expressly
authorizing criminal assault charges against a pregnant woman for
drug use, this article now considers how that law and others like it
comport with the ends of criminal justice. Criminal law arguably has
five objectives: restoration, incapacitation, rehabilitation, deterrence,
and punishment.123 Tennessee’s new assault statute, in particular,
and criminalizing pregnant drug use, in general, fail to satisfy these
objectives.
A. Restoration Fails: The Statute Is Not in the Baby’s Best Interest
Through restoration, criminal law seeks to repair any injury
inflicted upon the victim by the offender. In general, the goal of
restoration is to return the victim to his or her position prior to
injury.124 Restoration works effectively in cases where an offender is

licensed to perform such procedure.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c) (Supp. 2012). Amendment of section 107(c)(1) was
unnecessary and inadvisable. Reverting to the pre-2014 amendment form of section
107(c)(1) would not impact the efficacy of section 107(c)(2), as section 107(c)(2) begins
“Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(1).” TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (2014).
123. See, e.g., ELLEN S. PODGOR ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE
(2d ed. 2009); John B. Mitchell, Crimes of Misery and Theories of Punishment, 15
NEW. CRIM. L. REV. 465, 475 (2012). While a growing number of scholars recognize
restoration as an important goal of criminal law, the majority likely would not
characterize restoration as a traditional objective of criminal law. This article leads
with an analysis of restoration nonetheless because sponsors of Tennessee’s amended
assault law and others pushing further criminalization for pregnant drug use claim
to do so in order to protect the baby. The restoration analysis demonstrates that
further criminalization is not in the best interest of the baby.
124. See Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93,
99 (2014) (“Traditionally, . . . courts used restitution to financially restore a person
economically damaged by another’s actions, thereby preventing the unintended
beneficiary from being unjustly enriched at the aggrieved party’s expense.”).
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able to repay the amount improperly acquired, like fraud or theft,125
but it fails in the context of in utero drug exposure. In the case of in
utero drug exposure, criminalizing the mother’s conduct places the
baby in a worse position.126 If the goal of criminalizing pregnant
drug use is to protect the unborn, as proponents claim, it is
important to begin an analysis by considering the likely impact of
criminalization on the baby.
1. An Incentive to Abort
First, criminal laws that can be used to prosecute a pregnant
woman for behavior during pregnancy create a perverse incentive for
women to have an abortion. A woman who aborts her pregnancy in
accordance with the law prior to viability faces no liability, while a
woman who carries her baby to term after using illegal drugs may be
criminally prosecuted.127 It is impossible to ignore the cruel irony
that Tennessee’s assault law places the victims it purports to protect
in mortal danger, a far greater harm, by providing an incentive to
abort.128 Perhaps nothing demonstrates the moral perversion of
criminalization quite like considering that a woman who ingests
drugs pre-viability intending to kill her fetus (with a medically
supervised abortifacient) faces no criminal liability, while a woman
who takes drugs without intending to harm her fetus faces liability
for assault.129 Given the fact that there is no definitive evidence that

125. See id.
126. See, e.g., Meghan Horn, Note, Mothers Versus Babies: Constitutional and
Policy Problems with Prosecutions for Prenatal Maternal Substance Abuse, 14 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 635, 652 (2008).
127. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(c) (2014) (exempting an abortion
performed by a physician with consent through viability), with TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-13-107(c)(1)-(2) (2014) (defining assault to include unlawful acts or omissions
taken by a mother that harm her baby in utero).
128. This risk is especially acute given the lack of definitive evidence that NAS
causes long-term health consequences. See Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 28
(quoting Dr. Loretta Finnegan, an expert on NAS: “NAS is really a very minor
medical condition, in contrast to what can happen to a baby, both physically and
psychologically, if the mother is not in treatment.”);; see also Wong, Ordean, &
Kahan, supra note 29, at 376 (noting that there is no definitive evidence NAS causes
long-term harm).
129. Abortifacients—drugs that induce a miscarriage—such as RU-486 may be
taken legally early in pregnancy. Renée C. Wyser-Pratte, Protection of RU-486 as
Contraception, Emergency Contraception and as an Abortifacient Under the Law of
Contraception, 79 OR. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2000). A criminal law that only applied
post-viability would lessen, but not obviate, the incentive to abort.
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NAS birth causes any long-term health consequences,130 the risk of
incentivizing abortion seems wholly unacceptable.131
Pro-life advocates, in particular, should find Tennessee’s law
pernicious since it encourages a pregnant drug user who cannot (or
will not) successfully complete treatment to opt for abortion.132 Prochoice advocates should be concerned that the law provides a
pregnant woman who uses illegal narcotics only a Hobson’s choice:
she may wish to keep her baby but feel compelled to abort her
pregnancy to avoid potential criminal conviction. Such alternatives
make a mockery of reproductive “freedom” and “free choice.”
During the debate on criminalization of pregnant women’s drug
use, proponents denied that there would be an incentive to abort a
pregnancy, arguing that any woman criminally prosecuted would
have used illegal drugs within two days of delivery, too late for an
abortion.133 This argument ignores the plain language of the statute,
the factual evidence to the contrary, and, perhaps most importantly,
the potentially dangerous force of a legal incentive.134
First, the plain language of the statute is not limited to illegal
drug use in the final days of pregnancy or even in the last
trimester.135 To the contrary, the statute expressly authorizes
prosecution based on harm to the embryo or fetus at “any stage of
gestation,” including pre-viability when abortion is legal.136 Nothing

130. ACOG NAS Toolkit, supra note 29, at p. 2 (“There have been no reported
long term effects of maternal opioid use on the developing child.”).
131. Wong, Ordean, & Kahan, supra note 29, at 376.
132. Dosani, supra note 20 (reporting anecdotal evidence of pregnant women in
Tennessee considering abortion because of the new law).
133. S.B. 1391, 108th Gen. Assemb., S. Judiciary Comm. (Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014,
2:26:12) (statement of D.A. Barry Staubus), available at http://tnga.granicus.com/
MediaPlayer.php?view_id=%20269&clip_id=9050&meta_id=168824.
134. In addition, if the statute actually operates this way, the affirmative
defense provided in Section 107(c)(3) would be a cruel fiction, as a pregnant woman
would lack any meaningful opportunity to obtain treatment in the less than two days
remaining prior to birth. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(3) (2014) (requiring
women to have “actively enrolled in an addiction recovery program before the child is
born” to qualify for the affirmative defense).
135. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (2014).
136. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(a) (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(c)
(2014). On November 4, 2014, Tennessee voters passed a referendum amending the
state Constitution to allow legislation restricting abortion. See S.J. Res. 127, 108th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (creating ballot referendum to amend TENN.
CONST. art. I, § 36). Since that time, legislation has narrowed the right to abortion in
Tennessee, but the procedure remains legal. Tim Ghianni, Tennessee Governor Signs
Law Setting 48-Hour Abortion Wait Period, HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/18/tennessee-abortion-wait-p_n_7310058.
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prevents a prosecutor from bringing charges against a woman for
drug use at any point in her pregnancy.
Second, even if cases often stem from drug use at the end of
pregnancy, factually, women can and have been criminally
prosecuted in Tennessee and other states for earlier drug use.137
Several tests exist that provide evidence for such prosecutions. Urine
screens only detect relatively recent drug use, but such screens can
be, and often are, done on the mother much earlier in the pregnancy,
especially if drug use is suspected.138 Similarly, drug testing of
newborn hair or meconium can provide evidence of illegal drugs
ingested months before delivery.139 Moreover, prosecutors can bring
charges based on circumstantial evidence, witness testimony, or
admissions, without any conclusive drug tests.
Third, the incentive to abort applies whenever a pregnant drug
user believes that she has only two choices: jail or abortion—without
regard to whether or not her assessment is correct. For example,
even if affordable treatment is available prior to birth, a woman
might opt for an abortion due to a lack of knowledge of the statute’s
affirmative defense or fear that she will be unable to meet the
defense’s stringent requirements.140 This fear of prosecution or fear
of failure seems to be particularly acute among the women who are
commonly targeted for prosecution, less educated, less affluent
women, who are ill at ease with the court system, and often already
feel powerless.141 So, even if prosecution only actually occurs in cases

html. Given federal precedent, abortion seems likely to remain legal in Tennessee for
the foreseeable future.
137. See, e.g., Whitney Good, Gatlinburg Mom-to-Be Arrested for Allegedly
Taking Drugs While Pregnant, WATE (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.easttntimes.com/
News%202014/10012014/gatlinburgwomancharged.htm (reporting arrest of pregnant
woman pursuant to statute in connection with a disturbance call months prior to
birth). The statute has already been used to charge a pregnant woman who was not
within days of delivery. Id. Moreover, in Montana, Casey Gloria Allen was arrested
in connection with opiates she took when she was twelve weeks pregnant. See John
S. Adams, Judge Drops Drug Charge Against Pregnant Woman, USA TODAY, (Sept.
23, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/23/judge-drops-drugcharge-against-pregnant-mom/16125379/.
138. Wong, Ordean, & Kahan, supra note 29, at 370 (stating urine drug
screenings detect only recent drug use).
139. Id. (stating hair and meconium samples at birth can detect intrauterine
drug use from the second or third trimester).
140. Notwithstanding Tennessee’s Safe Harbor Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-10104(f) (2014), a pregnant drug user may also abort out of concern that report of her
drug use could cause her to lose custody of her older children.
141. See Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 27 (indicating that the nine
Tennessee women arrested under the amended statute “represent some of the state’s
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in which a woman uses illegal drugs shortly before delivery (and all
evidence is to the contrary), the troubling incentive to abort remains
likely to influence behavior pre-viability.142
2. A Dangerous Deterrent to Prenatal,
Postpartum, and Newborn Care
Even if a woman does not abort her pregnancy, criminalizing
pregnant drug use runs counter to the goal of restoration because it
deters a woman from seeking prenatal care. “Research and clinical
experience teach that when, as here, the personal risks of seeking
medical care are raised to intolerably high levels, it is more likely
that prenatal care and patient candor—and not drug use—will be
what is deterred, often with tragic health consequences.”143 Because
criminalizing pregnant drug use deters prenatal care, the American
Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists all oppose such
legislation.144 Internationally, the United Nations Special
Rapporteur for the Right to Health decries such laws because
“criminalization of conduct during pregnancy impedes access to
health care goods and services, infringing the right to health.”145
Once a pregnant woman becomes concerned that medical personnel
will report her drug use to the authorities, she has every incentive to
misrepresent her drug use or to avoid medical personnel altogether.

poorest areas, and all but one used a public defender”).
142. The practical effects of this incentive to abort likely depend in part on how
many pregnant drug users are aware of both their pregnancy and the law (or some
perceived version of it) prior to viability. Clinics report pregnant drug users in
Tennessee are aware of the law and that “[t]hey know they’re at risk for arrest and
prosecution.” See, e.g., Dave Boucher & Tony Gonzalez, Should Mom Be Charged?,
TENNESSEAN, April 9, 2015, at 9A (quoting Jessica Young, obstetrician at the
Obstetrics Drug Dependency Clinic at Vanderbilt University). Nonetheless, it is
difficult if not impossible to assess the increased risk of abortion with scientific
accuracy.
However, a law that would lead even one pregnant woman to abort her
baby is troubling, especially since there is no proof that NAS causes any long-term
health effects. See Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 28 (quoting Dr. Loretta
Finnegan, “NAS is really a very minor medical condition, in contrast to what can
happen to a baby, both physically and psychologically, if the mother is not in
treatment”);; Wong, Ordean, & Kahan, supra note 29, at 376 (noting that there is no
definitive evidence that NAS causes long-term harm).
143. Health Expert’s Amicus, supra note 4, at 6.
144. AAP Position, supra note 4, at 641; AMA Position, supra note 4, at 2667,
2670; ACOG Substance Abuse Opinion, supra note 4, at 2.
145. Special Rapporteur Position, supra note 4, at 12.
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Factually, this is already happening in Tennessee. Pregnant
women are avoiding prenatal care, and worse still, attempting detox
and delivery without medical supervision.146 After birth, some are
avoiding newborn care in an attempt to avoid detection of their drug
use.147 Most experts believe that lack of prenatal care poses a greater
risk for the unborn baby than a mother’s drug use.148 Likewise,
experts believe that attempting to detox without medical supervision
(which is often unavailable) poses a greater risk to the baby in utero
than continued drug use. Criminalizing drug use creates a
dangerous deterrent to the care a baby needs.
3. Because Demand Exceeds Supply, No Net Treatment Benefit
It is theoretically possible, of course, that criminalization could
incentivize a pregnant woman to enter treatment prior to birth when
such treatment might benefit (or “restore”) her unborn baby. Across
Tennessee and most of the United States, however, there would still
be no net benefit as a result of criminalization. As discussed above,
demand for treatment greatly exceeds the supply of available
treatment resources. Consequently, there can be no increase in the
total number of pregnant women treated until treatment options
become more readily available and accessible.149 Criminalization
does nothing to increase the supply of treatment options. As such,
any theoretical benefit is illusory. At most, one baby would be
restored at the expense of another.
Timing also makes such a benefit unlikely. A baby is often most
susceptible to damage from illegal drug use during the first

146. Boucher & Gonzalez, supra note 10 (“Laura Berlind, head of Renewal
House, an addiction treatment facility in Nashville, said she’d heard stories of
women giving birth outside of hospitals to avoid the authorities.”);; see also Dosani,
supra note 20 (Jessica Lyons, manager of a Tennessee treatment program, “said
pregnant women with addictions are already dropping out of treatment, avoiding
prenatal checkups and even considering abortion - all in fear of prosecution.”);;
Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 25 (quoting women who attempted to detox
without medical supervision, fled the state to deliver, and/or avoided prenatal care
after failed attempts to find available drug treatment in Tennessee).
147. E.g., Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 27.
148. AAP Position, supra note 4, at 641; AMA Position, supra note 4, at 2667,
2669; ACOG Substance Abuse Opinion, supra note 4, at 1.
149. See AAP Position, supra note 4, at 640–41 (finding that demand for
treatment “far exceeds supply”);; Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 26 (describing
the lack of available treatment for poor pregnant women); Gonzalez & Du Bois,
supra note 20 (stating that, in Tennessee, “[a]ddiction treatment is extremely limited
and costly—and nearly nonexistent for pregnant woman.”);; Scott, supra note 20
(decrying lack of available, appropriate treatment).
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trimester when women are often unaware that they are pregnant
and are least likely to be prosecuted.150 Moreover, as discussed
above, there will seldom be sufficient time between prosecution and
birth to find treatment. Further, aside from cases in which
treatment might prevent premature delivery, there is little evidence
that a pregnant drug user who enters treatment days before delivery
provides any benefit to her newborn. Certainly, public health experts
weighing any possible benefit to criminalization against the danger
of deterring prenatal care have almost uniformly concluded that
such laws are more likely to hurt a baby than help.151
4. Undermines the Baby’s Family
Criminalizing pregnant drug use also hurts the baby by
undermining his or her family. As discussed above, such laws create
a fictitious, adversarial relationship between mother and fetus that
is contrary to the reality of this interconnected and symbiotic
relationship.152 A pregnant woman and her fetus is a dyad, mutually
intertwined and not separate.153 Laws that presuppose a two-person
model, which does not factually exist, distort the natural oneness of
the maternal-fetal dyad and pit a pregnant woman against her
unborn baby in harmful ways.154
In addition, even after birth, the well-being of the mother and
baby remain interconnected. To the extent a woman faces jail time
as a result of an assault conviction, incarcerating the mother harms
her baby.155 In particular, the resulting separation interferes with

150. Ellen Marrus, Crack Babies and the Constitution: Ruminations About
Addicted Pregnant Women After Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 47 VILL. L. REV. 299,
319 (2002) (“The medical evidence indicates that drug abuse, similar to alcohol
abuse, does the most damage in the first trimester . . . .”).
151. AAP Position, supra note 4, at 641; AMA Position, supra note 4, at 2667;
ACOG Substance Abuse Opinion, supra note 4, at 1. Interestingly, however, after
negotiation and compromise, the Tennessee Medical Association did not oppose the
state’s amended assault law. Sydney Lupkin, Why Some Doctors Object to Tennessee
Law That Criminalizes Drug Use During Pregnancy, ABC NEWS (July 14, 2014),
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/doctors-object-tennessee-law-criminalizes-drugpregnancy/story?id=24557525.
152. ACOG Ethics Opinion, supra note 76.
153. Id. at 4.
154. Id.
155. Michal Gilad & Tal Gat, U.S. v. My Mommy: Evaluation of Prison Nurseries
as a Solution for Children of Incarcerated Women, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
371, 380 (2013) (“Children are affected by the incarceration of either parent, but they
typically experience greater harm when their mother is imprisoned.”);; Myrna S.
Raeder, A Primer on Gender-Related Issues That Affect Female Offenders, 20 CRIM.
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important maternal-infant bonding.156 This is problematic because
the quality of the mother–infant relationship has a significant
influence on a baby’s well-being, development, and adaptation
throughout life.157 In fact, empirical evidence demonstrates that
common symptoms of maternal separation include “attachment
disorders; aggression and anger; developmental and behavioral
problems; sleeping, eating, or attention disorders; delays in
educational development and achievement . . . [and] greater
likelihood to develop addiction to drugs or alcohol or engage in
criminal activity.”158 Further, if no close relatives of the mother are
available to care for her baby, and the state places the baby in foster
care in connection with a conviction, foster care may also harm the
baby. On average, children in foster homes struggle more with
mental illness, academic success, and criminal activity.159 Laws that
criminalize pregnant drug use fail to recognize the intrinsic
interconnectedness between a mother and her baby. While a baby is

JUST. 4, 7 (2013) (“It is common knowledge that children of incarcerated parents
have greater risk of offending.”).
156. Gilad & Gat, supra note 155, at 381; Kayla Johnson, Maternal-Infant
Bonding: A Review of Literature, 28 INTL. J. CHILDBIRTH EDUC. No. 3, 17, 19 (2013)
(finding that postnatal separation has negative outcomes on the mother-infant
bonding process that can affect the child's cognitive and socio-emotional
development, physical health, and personal relationships).
157. Johnson, supra note 156, at 21 (stating that the quality of the maternalinfant relationship has a significant influence on infant well-being, development, and
adaptation throughout life).
158. Gilad & Gat, supra note 155, at 381 (“Empirical evidence shows that the
separation of an infant from her mother during the first year drastically impairs her
ability to sympathize or show concern for others. Additional common symptoms of
maternal separation are attachment disorders; aggression and anger; developmental
and behavioral problems; sleeping, eating, or attention disorders; delays in
educational development and achievement; excessive hostile behaviors toward peers;
problems with social adaptation; greater likelihood to develop addiction to drugs or
alcohol or engage in criminal activity; and manifestation of sexually promiscuous
behavior.” (footnotes omitted)).
159. See, e.g., Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Adult Crime: Using
Investigator Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of Foster Care, 116 J. POL. ECON.
746, 748, 762 (2008) (noting that in marginal cases, children seem to do better with
their birth parents); Beth Troutman, Effects of Foster Care Placement on Young
Children’s Mental Health: Risks and Opportunities, IOWA CONSORTIUM FOR MENTAL
HEALTH 1–2 (2011), http://www.healthcare.uiowa.edu/icmh/archives/documents/
Effectsoffostercareplacementonyoungchildren.pdf (finding that infants who lack a
steady caretaker during the first year or so of life have issues creating attachment
bonds, damaging their mental and emotional well-being, and hindering
development).
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in utero and for the first few years after birth, it is impossible to
punish a mother without also punishing her baby.
5. Imposes Economic Hardship on the Baby
Unfortunately, criminalizing pregnant drug use also has the
practical effect of placing both mother and baby in a worse position
financially. So, not only is there no “restoration,” but criminal
liability actually has the opposite economic impact. It causes an
additional economic injury to the baby. Restoration fails in this
context because the baby’s economic well-being is intrinsically bound
to the mother’s economic well-being. A mother who is in jail or prison
is unable to provide care or economic support for her baby, and a
conviction will have long-term economic effects. Specifically, studies
estimate that being an ex-offender lowers employment rates by
between 0.3% to 0.9%.160 Conviction for a violent crime also impacts
future earnings and has an immediate fiscal impact on the family
due to lost wages, court costs, and probation costs. Accordingly, the
practical effect of criminalizing pregnant drug use is that the baby
has fewer available economic resources. Restoration is an
impossibility in this context.161
In summary, because saddling a pregnant woman with a violent
criminal conviction, or even threatening to do so, places the baby in
a far worse position, Tennessee’s amended assault statute is
contrary to the goal of restoration.
B. Incapacitation is Unnecessary and Harms the Baby
Likewise, criminalizing pregnant drug use fails to provide
meaningful incapacitation. Through incapacitation, criminal law
seeks to keep criminals away from society so that the public is

160. JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, EX-OFFENDERS AND THE LABOR MARKET
14 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ex-offenders2010-11.pdf.
161. Theoretically, of course, if a wealthy woman were criminally prosecuted for
pregnant drug use, a judge could order the woman to pay restitution into a trust for
her newborn. Practically, however, restoration will almost certainly never occur. In
2012, ninety-three percent of NAS births in Tennessee involved a woman so poor
that she qualified for state assistance. TennCare Enrollees Provisional 2012 Data,
supra note 12, at 2. Even for the remaining seven percent, most likely cannot afford
to pay restitution without a negative impact on the resources otherwise available to
the baby. Moreover, it would be virtually impossible for the state to prevent a more
affluent woman from simply providing fewer resources to the child growing up to
offset any restitution payment.
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protected from their misconduct.162 In the case of a pregnant woman
who uses drugs, the mother is usually only a direct danger to her
baby in utero.163 Separation during the pregnancy is, of course,
physically impossible. After the baby’s birth, separation for prior
drug use is no longer necessary for the baby’s protection and, in fact,
can cause additional harm to the baby.164 Generally, separating a
mother and her baby interferes with maternal-infant bonding and
thus causes harm to the baby.165 To the extent that separation after
birth is in the best interest of the baby, there are ample civil
remedies to achieve this result. In most situations, not only is
incapacitation after birth unnecessary, it is also impossible without
causing further harm to the baby.166
C. Rehabilitation Requires Treatment, Not Jail
Criminalization also fails from a rehabilitation perspective. The
goal of rehabilitation is to reform an offender.167 Numerous studies
have concluded that treatment is more effective than jail at
decreasing drug use, as well as other criminal recidivism.168

162. PODGOR, supra note 123, at 5.
163. Some mothers’ drug use interferes with parenting so much that the mother
remains a danger to her infant even after birth. As Tennessee has recognized by
passage of the Safe Harbor Act, however, this is not generally the case. See TENN.
CODE ANN. § 33-10-104(f) (2014),
164. C. Antoinette Clarke, Fins, Pins, Chips, & Chins: A Reasoned Approach to
the Problem of Drug Use During Pregnancy, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 634, 658–59
(1998) (“Unlike children who are physically or emotionally abused by their parents,
whose abuse stops when the parent is removed from the home, the harm inflicted on
drug-exposed babies ceases when the baby is born.”). Many women who use drugs
during pregnancy are capable of providing appropriate homes for their babies after
birth, and often, foster care is a worse alternative.
165. Gilad & Gat, supra note 155, at 380; Johnson, supra note 156, at 19.
166. See, e.g., Gilad & Gat, supra note 155, at 372; Johnson, supra note 156, at
20 (stating that postnatal separation has negative effects on the mother-infant
bonding process that can “affect the child's cognitive and socio-emotional
development, . . . physical health and personal relationships”);; Raeder, supra note
155, at 7.
167. PODGOR, supra note 123, at 5.
168. See STEVE AOS, ET AL., THE COMPARATIVE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
PROGRAMS TO REDUCE CRIME 23–26 (2001) (concluding that, generally, drug
treatment lowers criminal recidivism rates); THE NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUM. UNIV., SHOVELING UP II: THE IMPACT OF SUBSTANCE
ABUSE ON FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL BUDGETS 45 (2009) [hereinafter BUDGETARY
IMPACT] (scientific evidence confirms efficacy of science-based interventions);
Richard Elliott et al., Harm Reduction, HIV/AIDS, and the Human Rights Challenge
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Similarly, treatment is more effective than punishment at returning
a person to economic independence.
For taxpayers, it is important to understand that treatment also
offers enormous cost-saving potential as opposed to punishment.
Treatment costs less than a third of what incarceration costs.169
Several economic analyses comparing criminal prosecution to
treatment have concluded that “[s]ubstance abuse treatment is more
cost-effective than prison or other punitive measures.”170 One study
found that “[e]very dollar spent on drug treatment in the community
is estimated to return $18.52 in benefits to society.”171 Other studies
have estimated the return on every treatment dollar at closer to
$7.172 Studies have consistently shown, however, that treatment
pays off. In contrast, for every dollar spent on enforcement, society
receives only half of that value—$0.52 in benefit.173 Criminalization
is fiscally irresponsible; this waste of tax-payer dollars should
stop.174
Just as analyses of restoration and incapacitation demonstrate
that criminalizing pregnant drug use is not in the best interest of a
baby, an analysis of rehabilitation shows that criminalization is
ineffective rehabilitation and improperly squanders tax dollars.

to Global Drug Control Policy, 8 HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 104, 116–17 (2005);
Barry M. Lester et al., Substance Use During Pregnancy: Time for Policy to Catch Up
with Research, 1:5 HARM REDUCTION J. 16, 21 (Apr. 2004).
169. Scott, supra note 20 (noting that treatment costs less than a third as much
as incarceration).
170. JUSTICE POLICY INST., SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY
2 (2008) [hereinafter SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND SAFETY].
171. Id.
172. NAT’L INST. OF DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT:
A RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 13 (3d ed. 2012) (“According to several conservative
estimates, every dollar invested in addiction treatment programs yields a return of
between $4 and $7 in reduced drug-related crime, criminal justice costs, and theft.
When savings related to health care are included, total savings can exceed costs by a
ratio of 12 to 1.”);; Rydell, C.P. & Everingham, S.S., Controlling Cocaine, Prepared for
the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the United States Army (RAND Corp.,
1994), at xvi (estimating that every dollar spent on treatment returns $7.46 through
reduced crime and increased productivity).
173. Rydell, supra note 172.
174. See JEFFREY A. MIRON & KATHERINE WALDOCK, CATO INST., THE
BUDGETARY IMPACT OF ENDING DRUG PROHIBITION 2, 51 (2010); BUDGETARY IMPACT,
at 2 (estimating legalization of drugs would save $41.3 billion dollars per year in
government expenditure and also generate $46.7 billion dollars in new tax revenues).
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D. Criminalization Will Deter Prenatal Care, Not Drug Use
Perhaps the central fallacy of criminalization, however, is the
argument that it serves as a deterrent to pregnant drug use.
Certainly, there is no empirical evidence that criminalizing pregnant
drug use reduces NAS births.175 To the contrary, NAS births in
Tennessee have continued to increase since the state criminalized
pregnant drug use.176 In fact, at least one legislator has candidly
admitted that “[w]hatever we’re trying isn’t working.”177
Logically, criminalizing pregnant drug use cannot yield a
deterrent effect until the supply of drug treatment increases
dramatically. Experts overwhelming agree that an addict lacks
control over her addiction and is generally powerless to stop using
without
treatment—regardless
of
the
consequences.178
Criminalization does nothing to increase the amount of available
services so that a pregnant woman can receive treatment.179 Because
demand for treatment greatly exceeds the supply of treatment
options, even if criminalization increases the demand for treatment
(by offering a stronger incentive to obtain treatment), it will still fail
to increase the number of pregnant women actually being treated.180
Put differently, the number of pregnant women who stop using
drugs is currently limited by the supply of available treatment, not

175. Fentiman, supra note 107, at 261. Nationally and internationally, what
little evidence does exist on deterrence suggests that a harm reduction approach
would do more to decrease drug use than criminalization. Elliott, supra note 168;
Lester et al., supra note 168, at 16, 30.
176. Compare 2013 TN NAS Summary, supra note 19 (reporting 855 NAS births
in 2013), 2014 TN NAS Summary, supra note 19 (reporting 973 NAS births), and
2015 Year-To-Date TN NAS Summary, supra note 19 (reporting 550 NAS births
through Aug. 1, 2015), with Drug Dependent Newborns (Neonatal Abstinence
Syndrome): Surveillance Summary for the Week of April 20–26, 2014, TENN. DEP’T
HEALTH (Feb. 20, 2015), http://health.state.tn.us/MCH/PDFs/NAS/NASsummary_
Week_1714.pdf [hereinafter 2014 TN NAS Summary At Law Passage] (reporting the
number of NAS births for 2014 as of the date the new assault law became effective).
177. Gonzalez, supra note 41, at 5A (quoting Sen. Todd Gardenhire, RChattanooga); see also Boucher & Gonzalez, supra note 10, at 9A (“Treatment
facilities and advocates say the law isn’t working.”).
178. Health Expert’s Amicus, supra note 4, at 12–13; AAP Position, supra note 4,
at 640–41; ACOG Ethics Opinion, supra note 76, at 7; see also Clarke, supra note
164, at 659; Fentiman, supra note 107, at 266–67.
179. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (2014); Gonzalez, supra note 41, at 5A
(noting that Tennessee has done little to expand treatment services since
criminalization); Scott, supra note 20.
180. Dosani, supra note 20; Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 25; Gonzalez
& DuBois, supra note 20, at 15A; Scott, supra note 20.
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by the number of pregnant women willing to enter treatment. Until
the supply of available treatment exceeds the demand for treatment,
increasing the incentive to obtain treatment cannot and will not
result in more pregnant women receiving treatment and/or fewer
NAS births.181
Further, to the extent that a pregnant woman has control over
her drug use and a criminal conviction would be sufficient to deter
her, drug use is already criminal (independent of the amended
assault law).182 A pregnant woman also already faces the possibility
of losing custody of her baby and any prior children. As such, there is
no cogent reason to conclude that threatening a pregnant drug user
with an assault charge will provide any additional deterrent
effect.183 To the extent that evidence to date demonstrates anything
about this complicated, multifactored problem, it is that
criminalization is not an effective deterrent to drug use by pregnant
women.

181. Moreover, to the extent criminalization leads to efforts to detox without
medical supervision, unintended consequences may follow. Abrupt discontinuation of
opioids “can result in preterm labor, fetal distress, or fetal demise.” American
Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Committee on Health Care for
Underserved Women, Opioid Abuse, Dependence, and Addiction in Pregnancy, ACOG
Op. No. 524 (May 2012) (reaffirmed 2014). Detoxing without supervision is likely to
be more dangerous to the health of an unborn baby than the mother’s continued drug
use (because NAS appears to be a treatable, relatively short-term problem when
compared to miscarriage). Cf. Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 28 (quoting Dr.
Loretta Finnegan, an expert on NAS: “NAS is really a very minor medical condition,
in contrast to what can happen to a baby, both physically and psychologically, if the
mother is not in treatment.”); Wong, Ordean, & Kahan, supra note 29, at 376 (noting
that there is no definitive evidence NAS causes long-term harm). Accordingly, if
criminalization increases the incentive to stop using drugs, without making
treatment available, the unintended consequence could be fetal trauma or even
death during unsupervised detox.
182. Approximately forty-five percent of women using illegal drugs stop once
they learn they are pregnant. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., RESULTS FROM THE 2012 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH:
SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 23 (2013) (finding that, in 2012, the rate of illegal
drug use among pregnancy aged women nationwide was 10.7% but that rate
decreased to 5.9% among pregnant women).
183. Drug users are particularly unlikely to be more deterred by a marginal
increase in the potential severity of punishment. See Fentiman, supra note 107, at
261–62.
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E. Punishment is Unwarranted and Counterproductive
Criminalization also cannot be justified as retribution or
punishment. Retribution seeks to ensure that someone who breaks
the law gets the punishment that he or she deserves.184 When it
comes to pregnant drug use, moral culpability is complicated in ways
that impact the appropriateness of blame and punishment.185 First,
according to medical experts, addiction is a disease; a pregnant
woman who is an addict will generally be unable to stop on her
own.186 In Tennessee, as in many states, affordable, accessible drug
treatment is often unavailable for poor, pregnant women.187 The
disadvantaged pregnant women who are seeking treatment and are
being turned away do not deserve to be punished; they deserve to be
helped, especially since many became addicts by using legal
prescription drugs.
Second, many external factors appear to play a significant role in
making certain women particularly vulnerable to pregnant drug use.
For example, genetics play a role in drug use and addiction, as do
domestic violence and mental illness.188 In fact, in one study, twothirds of patients in substance abuse treatment reported being
physically or sexually abused as children.189 Moreover, pregnant
women who are prescribed opioids are almost twice as likely to
suffer from depression and almost three times as likely to suffer
from an anxiety disorder as other women.190 Similarly, having a
parent that used drugs appears to increase the risk of drug use.191

184. PODGOR, supra note 123, at 5.
185. See LYNN P. FREEDMAN, PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS
527, 530, 535 (Sofia Gruskin et al. eds., 2005).
186. Health Expert’s Amicus, supra note 4, at 6–8; AAP Position, supra note 4,
at 640–41; ACOG Substance Abuse Opinion, supra note 4.
187. AAP Position, supra note 4, at 640–41 (noting that demand for treatment
“far exceeds supply”);; Dosani, supra note 20 (reporting grossly inadequate
availability of drug treatment for pregnant women); Goldensohn & Levy, supra note
20, at 25 (reporting grossly inadequate availability of drug treatment for pregnant
women); Gonzalez & DuBois, supra note 20 (“Addiction treatment is extremely
limited and costly—and nearly nonexistent for pregnant women.”);; National Drug
Survey, supra note 97, at 7 (in 2013, 316,000 Americans tried and failed to obtain
substance abuse treatment, most commonly due to a lack of insurance coverage and
affordability); Scott, supra note 20.
188. ACOG Substance Abuse Opinion, supra note 4 (“Addiction is a chronic,
relapsing biological and behavioral disorder with genetic components.”).
189. Magnitude, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://archives.drugabuse.gov/
about/welcome/aboutdrugabuse/magnitude/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
190. Infant Outcomes, supra note 11, at 844.
191. By some estimates, more than eighty percent of addicted women have at
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Perhaps nothing highlights the role of external factors in
pregnant drug use as well as the significant geographic variability of
such use. The rate of NAS births is not uniform. Tennessee suffers
from a much higher rate of NAS births than the national average,
and within Tennessee, the rate of NAS births varies dramatically. In
the Sullivan Region of eastern Tennessee, in both 2013 and 2014,
approximately 50 per 1,000 live births were diagnosed with NAS—
more than 20 times the annual rate in the Jackson Region of
western Tennessee.192 In 2012, 76% of women who gave birth to a
baby diagnosed with NAS in Tennessee resided in eastern
Tennessee.193 These statistics are startling. Eastern Tennessee
moms are not bad mothers; they do not love their children less.
Traditional narratives of good and evil and the accompanying notion
of just punishment must be rewritten to acknowledge the multiple,
complicated external risk factors that contribute to pregnant drug
use.
Temporal variation also highlights the role of external
influences. There has been a dramatic increase in NAS births over
the last decade, both nationally and in Tennessee.194 The temporal
impact is perhaps most pronounced, however, in Kentucky. In
Kentucky, NAS births soared 48% in a single year (from 955 NAS
births in 2013 to 1,409 NAS births in 2014), a fifty-fold increase from
2000 when Kentucky reported only 28 NAS births.195 The
discrepancy in NAS births over time is troubling and underscores
the social and environmental forces underlying the current NAS
epidemic.
Clearly, the prescribing practices of medical professionals have a
major impact on susceptibility. In fact, the rate of NAS births by
geography discussed above mirrors a similar regional pattern for
prescription drug use and overdoses.196 It is no surprise that

least one chemically dependent parent. Heller, supra note 6.
192. 2013 TN NAS Summary, supra note 19; 2014 TN NAS Summary, supra
note 19.
193. TennCare Enrollees Provisional 2012 Data, supra note 12, at 3–4.
194. Associated Health Care Expenditures, supra note 8, at 1934, 1937 (reporting
that nationwide, NAS births nearly tripled from 2000 to 2009); NAS FAQs, supra
note 23 (noting that in Tennessee, NAS births rose ten times higher over the same
period).
195. Laura Ungar, Born Into Suffering: More Babies Arrive Dependent on Drugs,
USA TODAY (July 8, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/07/08/
babies-born-dependent-on-drugs-continue-to-rise/29212565/.
196. Geographic Distribution of NAS, supra note 9, at 653; Infant Outcomes,
supra note 11, at 842, 847; Toila et al., supra note 9, at 2122; TennCare Enrollees
Provisional 2012 Data, supra note 12, at 3.
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Tennessee has the highest rate of NAS births in the nation
considering that it also has one of the highest numbers of
prescriptions filled per person.197 Often, physicians prescribe
narcotics to a woman, who then becomes addicted and turns in her
addiction to diverted or illicit drugs.198 Experts estimate that threefourths of heroin users were first addicted to prescription drugs.199
In order to combat NAS, states will have to take more steps to
reform their prescription drug practices and to increase access to
contraception, education, and opportunities for drug treatment.200
Poverty also appears to correlate strongly with increased risk of
NAS birth.201 In Tennessee, from 2008 to 2012, 93% of reported NAS
cases arose out of households that qualified for TennCare.202
Nationally, over 80% of newborns diagnosed with NAS relied on
state-funded health care.203 The markedly higher reported incidence

197. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., RETAIL PRESCRIPTION DRUGS FILLED AT
PHARMACIES (ANNUAL PER CAPITA) (2011) (reporting Tennessee fills 18.7
prescriptions per person compared to a national average of 12.71; Kentucky fills 21.5;
and West Virginia fills 21.4 prescriptions per person).
198. See Barnes, supra note 88. To make matters worse, eighty-two percent of
women prescribed narcotics are not on contraceptives, and eighty-six percent of NAS
births were unintended pregnancies. Heil et al., supra note 12, at 200; TennCare
Enrollees Provisional 2012 Data, supra note 12, at 6. When doctors prescribe
addictive drugs to women without contraception, they are unintentionally feeding
the NAS epidemic.
199. See Barnes, supra note 88 (citing 2015 report from the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention).
200. See supra text accompanying note 90 (providing a brief description of some
of Tennessee’s recent legislative efforts to address the prescription drug epidemic).
201. See TennCare Enrollees Provisional 2012 Data, supra note 12, at 4 (ninetyfour percent involve non-Hispanic whites). In Tennessee, the overwhelming majority
of NAS births involve white women. Id. Accordingly, one would not expect
Tennessee’s criminal law to suffer from the racially discriminatory application
reported in other states’ efforts at criminalizing pregnant drug use. See, e.g., CarlaMichelle Adams, Criminalization in Shades of Color: Prosecuting Pregnant DrugAddicted Women, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 89, 94, 103–04 (2013); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1424, 1432, 1481 (1991). Yet, five of
nine arrests reported in the first few months the law was effective in Tennessee
involved African American women. Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 25. Given
the relatively small percentage of NAS births attributable to African-Americans,
these statistics are troubling and this issue merits further tracking.
202. TennCare Enrollees Provisional 2012 Data, supra note 12, at 2.
203. Geographic Distribution of NAS, supra note 9, at 653 (from 2009 to 2012,
over eighty percent of infants with NAS were enrolled in state Medicaid programs);
see also Associated Health Care Expenditures, supra note 8, at 1936 (from 2000 to
2009, seventy-eight percent of infants with NAS were enrolled in state Medicaid
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of NAS among those eligible for state assistance seems to indicate
that structural violence plays a role in pregnant drug use, although
such statistics may also reflect at least in part a testing, diagnosing
and/or reporting bias.204 Poor women are not “worse” mothers than
wealthier women, and they do not love their babies less. If policy
makers ignore this fundamental truth and blame only the pregnant
drug user, without regard for or change to the structures that
reinforce such use, states will never stem their NAS epidemic.
The caricature of a pregnant woman using drugs because she is
selfish and uncaring withers under evidence of an overwhelming
correlation between external factors beyond individual control and a
dramatic increase in pregnant drug use. Pregnant drug use cannot
be reduced to personal responsibility alone, although such
responsibility should not be discounted entirely. Until the
prescription drug crisis is remedied205 and there is affordable
treatment available for all pregnant women, punitive policies that
criminalize pregnant drug use are unjust. Moreover, even if a
pregnant woman did “deserve” punishment, it would be manifestly
unfair to punish her knowing that such punishment would, as set
forth in detail above, also unavoidably punish her already vulnerable
baby.
CONCLUSION
In Tennessee, it appears that medical experts have been better
forecasters of the impact of criminalizing pregnant drug use than
prosecutors. Women report skipping prenatal care, delivering at
home, and fleeing the state in an effort to avoid criminal liability.206
Meanwhile, NAS births continue to rise, belying any assertion that
the law would serve as an effective deterrent. Several of the women
charged under the new law actively sought treatment during

programs).
204. Also concerning, while women with family incomes of less than $20,000 per
year were more than twice as likely as women with incomes over $75,000 to report
use of illegal drugs, this differential would only explain a small fraction of the
increase in reported incident of NAS. See SHARON L. LARSON ET AL., DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, WORKER SUBSTANCE USE AND WORKPLACE POLICIES
AND PROGRAMS 15 (2007) (13.2% at $20,000 or lower v. 6.0% at $75,000 or higher).
205. Dosani, supra note 20; Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 28; Gonzalez
& DuBois, supra note 20; Scott, supra note 20.
206. In the first 6 months of Tennessee’s law, 57 Tennessee women fled the state
to deliver a baby with NAS in a neighboring state. Gonzalez & Boucher, supra note
142.
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pregnancy, only to be repeatedly turned away.207 As for one of the
women charged, her “boyfriend found her dangling from the
clothesline pole in her grandmother’s yard.”208 She simply “couldn’t
shake her addiction or the depression that plagued her.”209 Allowing
a pregnant woman who uses drugs to be prosecuted for assault is
ultimately cruel, counterproductive, harmful to her newborn, and a
waste of taxpayer dollars. Tennessee should allow its new assault
law to lapse in 2016, and other states should avoid adopting similar
statutes that criminalize pregnant drug use.210

207. Goldensohn & Levy, supra note 20, at 26–27.
208. Id. at 25.
209. Id.
210. While completely allowing the law to sunset would be ideal, at an absolute
minimum, Tennessee should revert to the pre-amendment version of Section
107(c)(1) and amend Section 107(c)(3) to provide:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution permitted by subdivision (c)(2)
that the woman successfully completed an addiction recovery program,
regardless of whether the child was born addicted to or harmed by the
narcotic drug. Any woman charged under subdivision (c)(2) must be offered
affordable placement in an addiction recovery program, with the
opportunity to satisfy this affirmative defense.
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